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On Failing Forward: Neoliberal Legality
in the Mekong River Basin
Fleur Johns†
In the United States and around the world, collective inquiry is under-
way into “neoliberal legality,” or relations between legal and neoliberal
thought and practice.  Scholars are exploring what demands neoliberalism
might make of law and lawyers and how legal norms, institutions, and
practices might express or call into question neoliberal principles.  This
Article contributes to this inquiry by focusing on a characteristic of
neoliberal experimentation in the development field: the tendency of
neoliberal experiments to “fail forward.”  In other words, when develop-
ment projects fail to realize their transformative promises, this failure has
not tended to impede later projects from proceeding on more or less
unchanged policy premises.  A modular understanding of the law, of a
kind propagated in the influential writings of economist Milton Friedman
and elsewhere, is critical to neoliberalism’s maintenance of forward
momentum through such instances of apparent failure.  This Article will
support this claim by describing legal regimes surrounding two hydro-
power development projects undertaken in the past decade in the Mekong
River Basin (in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic) in Southeast Asia.  In
this setting, forward failure has also been maintained through the inter-
twining of neoliberal reform agendas and the politico-economic ambitions
of a one-party state.
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Introduction
In the United States and around the world, collective inquiry is under-
way into “neoliberal legality,” or relations between legal and neoliberal
thought and practice.1  Scholars in a number of jurisdictions are exploring
what demands neoliberalism might make and how legal norms, institu-
tions, and practices might express or call into question neoliberal
precepts.2  This Article contributes to the inquiry through attention to a
characteristic of neoliberal experimentation in the development field: the
tendency of neoliberal experiments to “fail forward” in that “their manifest
inadequacies have . . . repeatedly animated further rounds of neoliberal
invention.”3  In this context, the “inadequacies” in question are not finan-
cial or developmental shortfalls.  Rather, the generative failures on which
this Article focuses concern the non-realization of expectations that
neoliberal policy measures might engender systematic transformation in
the targeted society and promote widespread market participation.
Neoliberal experiments “fail forward” when their transformative promise
goes unrealized, without this dampening the ardor of that promise’s further
pursuit.
This Article claims that a modular understanding of the law, of a kind
propagated in the influential writings of economist Milton Friedman and
elsewhere, has been critical for neoliberalism’s maintenance of forward
1. This term, and related terms, have been scattered throughout legal scholarly
literature over the past decade or more, law and society literature and scholarship in
international law especially. See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS & CE´SAR RODRI´GUEZ-
GARAVITO, LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 11,
31– 33 (2005); ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: REIMAGINING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2011). Nevertheless, as David Singh Grewal and Jedediah
Purdy highlight, with reference to “neoliberalism” in general, it “may be unfamiliar to
some American legal audiences.” David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction:
Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2014). Scholarly embrace of the
term, or interest in the phenomenon ‘neoliberalism’ as such is, however, far from univer-
sal. See, e.g., Bruce Caldwell, The Chicago School, Hayek, and Neoliberalism, in BUILDING
CHICAGO ECONOMICS 301 (Robert Van Horn et al. eds., 2011) (reprimanding that “the
term ‘neoliberalism’ is not a doctrine that any of the principal actors [of the Mont
Pe`lerin Society and the Chicago School of free market economics] promoted or
defended”). For the meaning given the term neoliberalism here, see infra Part I.
2. See, e.g., the following scholarly workshops, held in 2013– 2014 in Australia,
Argentina, Finland, and the United Kingdom, respectively. The Politics of Legality in a
Neoliberal Age, UNSW AUSTRALIA (Aug. 1– 2, 2014), available at http://
www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/neoliberal-
ism_workshop_program_0.pdf (at which a version of this paper was delivered) [hereinaf-
ter Politics of Legality Workshop]; Sociedad Latinoamericana: Entre la Altermodernidad y
la Gobernanza Neoliberal: El Desaf´ıo de la Fraternidad, UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES
FACULTY OF LAW (June 16, 2014), available at http://www.derecho.uba.ar/derechoaldia/
notas/sociedad-latinoamericana-entre-la-altermodernidad-y-la-gobernanza-neoliberal-el-
desafio-de-la-fraternidad/+5287; Imagining Post-Neoliberal Regulatory Subjectivities, UNI-
VERSITY OF TURKU FACULTY OF LAW (Oct. 15– 17, 2014), available at http://lawinthe-
lighthouse.wordpress.com; Understanding Neoliberal Legality: Perspectives on the Use of
Law By, For, and Against the Neoliberal Project, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (Dec. 24, 2013),
available at http://politicsinspires.org/understanding-neoliberal-legality-perspectives-
use-law-neoliberal-project/.
3. JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL REASON 6 (2010).
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momentum through repeated instances of failure.  The stylized under-
standing of law that Friedman’s writings popularized has helped to ensure
the durability of accompanying economic policies.4  Precisely as the law
and development movement has been beset by cycles of “normative judg-
ment,” so the way has been smoothed for neoliberal experimentation iden-
tified more with economics than with law and framed as dealing “with
‘what is,’ not with ‘what ought to be.’”5
This article will support this claim by describing the legal regimes sur-
rounding two hydropower development projects undertaken in the past
decade in the Mekong River Basin in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao PDR, or Laos) in Southeast Asia.  It will analyze these regimes as
instances of “actually existing neoliberalism,” at least in part.6  These
development projects are of global concern, including to the United States;
this concern was reflected, for example, in the U.S. State Department’s cre-
ation of the Lower Mekong Initiative in July 2009.7  In April 2014, a
spokesperson for the U.S. State Department emphasized hydropower
projects’ high stakes: “[T]oday . . . [i]ncreasing demands, rapid develop-
ment, and climate change are putting greater pressure on the river— threat-
ening the Mekong’s unique environment and the livelihoods of the people
that depend on it.”8
Apart from its account of neoliberalism’s “forward failure” through the
law, this article describes Lao hydropower development as a story of co-
production between a neoliberal reform agenda and the politico-economic
ambitions of a relatively repressive, one-party state.9  Though the rhetoric
of neoliberal texts is sometimes floridly anti-state, it has been observed
repeatedly that neoliberal practices may embolden rather than constrict
state power, including authoritarian state power.  This dynamic was
famously captured in Andrew Gamble’s account of the rise of the “free
4. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS
IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3– 16, 30– 43 (1953) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS].
5. On law and development’s subjection to successful cycles of judgment, see David
M. Trubek, The Nature of Law and Development: The Owl and the Pussy-Cat: Is There a
Future for “Law and Development”?, 25 WIS. INT’L L. J. 235 (2007); DAVID M. TRUBEK &
ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David
M. Trubek et al. eds., 2006). On positive economics’ allegiance to “what is,” see FRIED-
MAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 4.
6. Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing
Neoliberalism”, 34 ANTIPODE 349, 349 (2002).
7. Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, The U.S. and the Lower Mekong: Building
Capacity to Manage Natural Resources (Jan. 6, 2010).
8. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, A Milestone for the Mekong River Com-
mission (Apr. 4, 2014).
9. On the contemporary political culture and organization of Laos and the role of
the State, see generally Martin Stuart-Fox, Politics and Reform in the Lao People’s Demo-
cratic Republic (Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, Working Paper No. 126,
2005); Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos: The Chinese Connection, 2009 SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
141 (2009); ERIC PAUL, OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A STUDY OF
THE NATION STATE, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ORDER 58– 64 (2010); Holly High & Pierre
Petit, Introduction: The Study of the State in Laos, 37 ASIAN STUDIES REV. 417 (2013);
Roberto Bellini, Building Civil Society in Lao PDR: The Decree on Associations, 24 DEV. IN
PRACTICE 353 (2014).
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economy and the strong state” in Margaret Thatcher’s Britain.10  In con-
trast to Thatcher’s Britain, however, in the Lao hydropower development
setting, state power has not been augmented under the rubric of “law and
order.”11  Instead, in Laos, an increase in state power has occurred through
an apparent devolution or handover of public power— that is, its submis-
sion to mechanisms of audit and consultation— at least for a time.12  To
understand this “anti-state” promotion of state power, Milton Friedman
seems precisely the right thinker to engage.  Friedman is noteworthy for
his practice of combining, on the one hand, strong policy commitments in
favor of competition and individual (consumer) empowerment, and on the
other, relative indifference to the form of government responsible for deliv-
ering on those commitments.13  Famously, Friedman championed “posi-
tive economics,” which focused on generating reliable predictions about
the effect of policy levers.  This approach claimed to be “in principle inde-
pendent of any particular ethical position or normative judgments.”14
This Article’s first section briefly introduces the sense in which
neoliberalism is used in this discussion.  The second section familiarizes
the reader with contemporary Lao hydropower development, focusing on
two recent projects known as Nam Theun 2 and Xayaburi.  The third sec-
tion links the legal regimes surrounding these projects with the highly styl-
ized program for law and lawyers that Milton Friedman laid out in his
classic 1962 text, Capitalism and Freedom.15  It explains how the first of
these projects, Nam Theun 2, could be construed as a failure when viewed
through the lens of Friedman’s 1962 book.  Nonetheless, this failure did
not seem to impede a reiteration of Friedman’s model in the Xayaburi pro-
ject, albeit with significant modifications.  The fourth section highlights the
modular conception of law operationalized in both the Nam Theun 2 and
Xayaburi projects.  It argues that this modularity has been vital to the dura-
bility of neoliberal legality, and more broadly, to the neoliberal develop-
ment agenda.  The Article’s concluding section explains some of the
analysis’ implications for law and development scholarship and practice.
I. Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism has “many authors, many birthplaces,” and “has always
been on the move”; accordingly, it is notoriously difficult to pin down.16
Textually, one can trace the term’s provenance to the late nineteenth cen-
tury, when the French economist and economic historian Charles Gide, a
10. ANDREW GAMBLE, THE FREE ECONOMY AND THE STRONG STATE: THE POLITICS OF
THATCHERISM 31– 37 (1988).
11. See generally STUART HALL, DRIFTING INTO A LAW AND ORDER SOCIETY (1980); Lo¨ıc
Wacquant, Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity, 25
SOC. F., 197 (2010).
12. HALL, supra note 11, at 3– 4.
13. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 1– 6 (1962) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM].
14. FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 4.
15. See generally FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13.
16. PECK, supra note 3, at 39.
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champion of consumers’ and agricultural cooperatives, attacked the Italian
economist Maffeo Pantaleoni and other “adepts of Neo-liberalism” for
defending a “[h]edonistic world . . . in which free competition will reign
absolutely; where all monopoly by right or of fact will be abolished; where
every individual will be conversant with his true interests, and as well
equipped as any one else to fight for them; [and] where everything will be
carried on by genuinely free contract . . . .”17
In the 1930s, neo-liberalism again surfaced amid the rise of John May-
nard Keynes’s economic ideas; which remained ascendant until the mid-
1970s.  In that context, neo-liberalism was a pejorative term directed
towards critics of state intervention in the economy through monetary and
fiscal policy.18  For example, American political scientist Charles Merriam
derided writer Walter Lippmann’s “neo-liberal” attempt to rewrite classical
liberal doctrine against the New Deal’s policy developments by recourse to
the work of Austrian economists, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich
Hayek.19  What we now know as neoliberalism emerged from a collective
re-thinking of classical liberal economics from the late 1930s onward; a
collective endeavor in which Mises and Hayek were both pivotal.20
If neoliberalism developed as an argument for government promotion
of competitive capitalism against “Keynesian policy, social pacts of war,
and the growth of the federal administration through economic and social
programs,” it also rejected classical economic liberalism’s adherence to the
dogma of “truck and barter.”21  One element to which the “neo-” in
neoliberalism relates was its dismissal of what Hayek termed the “wooden
insistence of some liberals on some rules of thumb, above all the principles
of laissez-faire.”22  One cannot reduce neoliberalism to a uniform code, or
to a politics of “Right” or “Left.”  Neoliberalism invites relentless experi-
17. Charles Gide, Has Co-operation Introduced a New Principle into Economics?, 8 THE
ECON. J. 490, 494 (1898). See Dag Einar Thorsen, The Neoliberal Challenge: What is
Neoliberalism?, 2 CONTEMP. READINGS IN L. & SOC. JUST. 188, 197– 99 (2010).
18. GORDON FLETCHER, THE KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION AND ITS CRITICS: ISSUES OF THEORY
AND POLICY FOR THE MONETARY PRODUCTION ECONOMY (1987); JOHN EDWARD KING, A HIS-
TORY OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS SINCE 1936 238 (2002). The relationship of neo-
liberalism to Keynesian thought and policy is, nevertheless, far from one of straightfor-
ward opposition. In responding to some economists critical of his work, Milton Fried-
man emphasized “what a great economist Keynes was and how much more [Friedman]
sympathize[d] with his approach and aims than those of many of [Keynes’] followers.”
Milton Friedman, Comments on the Critics, 80 J. POL. ECON.  906, 908 (1972).
19. Charles E. Merriam, Review of the Good Society by Walter Lippmann, 53 POL. SCI.
Q. 129, 133 (1938). See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE
COLLE`GE DE FRANCE, 1978– 1979, 216– 19 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans.,
2008).
20. PHILIP MIROWSKI, THE ROAD FROM MONT PE`LERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL
THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 417, 428– 33 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009). On
divergences between Hayek and Mises, see generally Joseph T. Salerno, Mises and Hayek
Dehomogenized, 6 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 113 (1993); Joa˜o Rodrigues, The Political and
Moral Economies of Neoliberalism: Mises and Hayek, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1001 (2013).
21. FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 217; Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of
Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY & EVENT 1, 4 (2003).
22. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 17 (1944) [hereinafter HAYEK, THE
ROAD].
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mentation.23  Even so, common among neoliberal thinkers is a commit-
ment to maintaining a “competitive order,” and conditions favorable to
competition, through the performance of “positive functions” on the part of
the state.24  Extending this competitive imperative to all spheres of human
existence, neoliberalism elaborates a “whole way of being and thinking.”
Central to this “way of being” is the figure of the “entrepreneur” engaged in
action on the basis of choice.  Above all, it emphasizes entrepreneurship of
the self, in circumstances where foresight is presumed impossible.25
According to Mises, neoliberalism’s goals are neither a realistic representa-
tion of the human condition, nor the pursuit of just or rational ends.
Rather, neoliberalism seeks to produce a “science of means,” centered on
the “categorical elements of choice and action.”26  It aims not at govern-
ment of a particular size or stripe.  Rather, its goal is government of a par-
ticular persuasion, namely, a government all actions of which may be
justified as promoting and preserving “the catallaxy,” that is, “the sponta-
neous order of the market.”27  Crucially for purposes of this Article, inter-
national legal norms and institutions have long been seen as vital to the
worldwide propagation of such a neoliberal “common sense.”28
By way of elucidating with some precision an account of neoliberal
legality representative of this “thought collective,” this Article will later nar-
row its attention to one of its most prominent participants in the United
States, Milton Friedman, and focus on just one of Friedman’s books (per-
haps his best known): Capitalism and Freedom.29  Nonetheless, Friedman’s
1962 text is not, of course, a summation of all that is or might be termed
neoliberal, nor is it definitive in its rendition of neoliberal legality.  There
are aspects of his account with which fellow neoliberals would probably
have disagreed at the time of publication.  Associations between the above-
mentioned Austrian economists and the Chicago School of economics,
with which Milton Friedman has long been identified, were far from
straightforward; the Mont Pe`lerin Society that brought them together
23. Friedrich A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, 5 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON.
9, 10 (2002) (“[C]ompetition is important only because and insofar as its outcomes are
unpredictable and on the whole different from those that anyone would have been able
to consciously strive for; and . . . its salutary effects must manifest themselves by frus-
trating certain intentions and disappointing certain expectations.”).
24. Milton Friedman, Neoliberalism and its Prospects, FARMAND, Feb. 17, 1951, at 89
(1951).
25. FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 218, 226.
26. Ludwig von Mises, The Treatment of “Irrationality” in the Social Sciences, 4 PHIL.
& PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 527, 531 (1944).
27. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Market Order or Catallaxy, in 2 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND
LIBERTY 107 (1978).
28. PECK, supra note 3, at 73 (tracking “the winding path of neoliberalism from
crank science to common sense”). See, e.g., James T. Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism
and International Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legiti-
macy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996 (2000); James T. Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional
Trade Agreements, 86 WASH. L. REV. 421 (2011); Tor Krever, The Legal Turn in Late Devel-
opment Theory: The Rule of Law and the World Bank’s Development Model, 52 HARV. INT’L
L. J. 288 (2011).
29. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13.
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remained, at all times, a “heterogeneous group.”30  Furthermore, there are
dimensions of Friedman’s thought that would not find favor today among
those who continue to evaluate all law and policy against a market-
favorable benchmark.31  This 1962 text, and the neoliberalism it voiced,
may also be non-representative of Friedman’s later work, in which his toler-
ance for regulation— even market-complementary regulation— seemed to
narrow considerably.32  With these cautionary notes in mind, Friedman
(posthumously) and this 1962 book may still be regarded as iconic of a
neoliberal creed; Paul Krugman observed that Friedman has long served as
the “ultimate avatar” of market fundamentalist economics.  Ronald Chen
and Jon Hanson have similarly called him “America’s, and perhaps the
world’s, best-known free marketer.”33  In light of the modular view of law
that he helped generate (as discussed in Part IV), it is striking that Fried-
man himself has become somewhat of an archetype or model of the
neoliberal thinker and actor in the world.
In this context, let us now turn to a pair of development projects
which evidence the “complex ‘cutting’ of market and nonmarket modes of
governance” that has tended to take place under the rubric of neoliberal-
ism.34  The focus of the next section will be the Nam Theun 2 hydropower
project, financed in 2005 and operated since 2010 on a tributary of the
Mekong River in Laos, and the far larger Lao project into which it “failed
forward”: the Xayaburi Dam, under construction on the Mekong River
mainstream, and scheduled to become operational in 2019.35
30. PECK, supra note 3, at 40, 51.
31. Robert Moffitt’s observation that some contemporary trends in the U.S. policy
environment promoted by conservative voices, such as the imposition work require-
ments for welfare, “run fundamentally in opposition” to Friedman’s proposal for “nega-
tive taxation,” that is, a state payment to those whose taxable income is zero, the level of
which is gradually ratcheted back as earned income rises. See, e.g., Robert A. Moffitt,
The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9751, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w9751.pdf; FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 192.
32. See generally Lanny Ebenstein, The Increasingly Libertarian Milton Friedman: An
Ideological Profile, 11 ECON. J. WATCH 81 (2014).
33. Paul Krugman, Milton Friedman, Unperson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2013, at A17
(claiming Friedman used to be the “ultimate avatar of conservative economics, [but] has
essentially disappeared from right-wing discourse” because of the movement of US con-
servatives to the political right and their “reject[ion] [of] reality”); Ronald Chen & Jon
Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate
Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2004).
34. PECK, supra note 3, at 23.
35. On the Nam Theun 2 Dam, see generally NTPC: POWERING THE FUTURE, http://
www.namtheun2.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2015); LAO NAM THEUN 2 POWER PROJECT,
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P076445/lao-nam-theun-2-power-project-former-
under-pe-p004206-len?lang=EN (last visited Apr. 22, 2015); NAM THEUN 2 DAM, http://
www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/nam-theun-2-dam (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
On the Xayaburi Dam, see generally XAYABURI POWER, http://www.xayaburi.com (last
visited Apr. 22, 2015); XAYABURI DAM, http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/
xayaburi-dam (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
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II. Introducing Lao Hydropower: Nam Theun 2 and Xayaburi
The Mekong River Basin, cradling Southeast Asia’s longest river,
passes through the People’s Republic of China, Myanmar (Burma), Laos,
Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  About two thirds of the approximately
65 million people who live in the Basin depend on the river’s aquatic
resources for subsistence, and also use river water for drinking, transporta-
tion, and irrigation.36  The Mekong River Basin, including its watershed or
catchment area, comprises ninety-seven percent of the land-locked terri-
tory of Laos, and approximately ninety-seven percent of the Lao population
resides within the Basin.37  In 2012, that population comprised approxi-
mately 6.5 million people.38  In 2007-2008, about a quarter of the Lao pop-
ulation lived below the national poverty line and approximately thirty-
seven percent fell below the international poverty line, living on less than
$1.25 per day (measured at 2005 international prices adjusted for purchas-
ing power parity).39  In 2011, approximately thirty percent of rural villages
with road access and sixty-one percent of villages without road access in
Laos did not have electricity.40
Plans for large-scale hydropower development throughout the Mekong
River Basin have been circulating since the 1950s.41  Even in the midst of
war, Laos has shown longstanding enthusiasm for these and the prospect
of the export income that they offer, through sale of electricity to neighbor-
ing Thailand and Vietnam.42  The first large hydropower dam in Laos, the
Nam Ngum I Dam, was built in the late 1960s and commissioned between
1971 and 1984; a second, Theun Hinboun, was commissioned in 1998.43
It would take until 1993, however, for the first of a cascade of major
36. Guy Ziv et al., Trading-off Fish Biodiversity, Food Security, and Hydropower in the
Mekong River Basin, 109 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF AM. 5609, 5609
(2012); MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION: STATE OF THE BASIN REPORT (2010), available at http:/
/www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/basin-reports/MRC-SOB-report-2010full-
report.pdf.
37. RAJESH DANIEL ET AL., GOVERNING THE MEKONG: ENGAGING IN THE POLITICS OF
KNOWLEDGE xv (Louis Lebel et al. eds., 2013); Mekong Basin, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (2011), http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/mekong/
index.stm. See also Avijit Gupta & S.C. Liew, The Mekong from Satellite Imagery: A Quick
Look at a Large River, 85 GEOMORPHOLOGY 259 (2007).
38. GOVERNMENT OF THE LAO PDR & THE UNITED NATIONS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOP-
MENT GOALS PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE LAO PDR 2013 12 (2013).
39. Id. at 21.
40. Id. at 29.
41. Carl Middleton et al., Old and New Hydropower Players in the Mekong Region:
Agendas and Strategies, in CONTESTED WATERSCAPES IN THE MEKONG REGION: HYDROPOWER,
LIVELIHOODS AND GOVERNANCE  23, 23– 24 (Franc¸ois Molle et al. eds., 2009).
42. The war known in the West as the Vietnam War or the Second Indochina War,
and in Southeast Asia as the American War, was fought in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos
between 1955 and 1975. See generally MARILYN B. YOUNG, THE VIETNAM WARS
1945– 1990 (1991). On Lao political history prior to this, from nineteenth century
French colonization onwards, see generally SøREN IVARSSON, CREATING LAOS: THE MAKING
OF A LAO SPACE BETWEEN INDOCHINA AND SIAM, 1860– 1945 (2008).
43. Middleton et al., supra note 41, at 23– 27; Ian Porter & Jayasankar Shivakumar,
Overview, in DOING A DAM BETTER: THE LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE
STORY OF NAM THEUN 2 1, 7 (Ian Porter & Jayasankar Shivakumar eds., 2011).
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Mekong River Basin dams originally envisaged in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury to receive a governmental mandate: the dam so mandated was Nam
Theun 2.44  Temporarily beset by liquidity problems and a regional slump
in electricity demand amid the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, it
would not be until 2005 that some twenty-seven financial institutions, led
by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, would agree to
finance the approximately U.S. $1.5 billion required for Nam Theun 2’s
development.45
Located on the Nakai Plateau in south-central Laos, Nam Theun 2 is a
39-meter high, 436-meter long concrete gravity dam constructed on the
Nam Theun, a tributary of the Mekong River; water released from it flows
into another Mekong River tributary, the Xe Bang Fai.  The project included
development of a 1,070 MW power plant designed to export approximately
995 MW of electricity to Thailand, under a take-or-pay power purchase
agreement with the state-owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thai-
land (EGAT), and to supply about 75 MW to the state-owned Electricite´ du
Laos for Lao consumption.  The special purpose vehicle created for the pro-
ject, and the beneficiary of a twenty-five year concession from the Lao Gov-
ernment entitling it to build, own, and operate the project and then transfer
it back to the state at the end of the concession term, is the Nam Theun 2
Power Company Limited (NTPC).  NTPC is a limited liability company cre-
ated under Lao law and is forty percent owned by EDF International (a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the predominantly state-owned French com-
pany Electricite´ de France, EDF); twenty-five percent owned by Lao Hold-
ing State Enterprise (LHSE, a Lao state-owned company established in
February 2005 to hold the Lao government’s shares in NTPC); and thirty-
five percent owned by Electricity Generating Public Company Limited
(EGCO, a publicly listed company on the Thai Stock Exchange incorpo-
rated by EGAT and in which EGAT retains a shareholding of approximately
twenty-five percent).  The base project cost of U.S. $1.25 billion was funded
twenty-eight percent by equity and seventy-two percent by debt, with an
additional U.S. $200 million of contingent costs financed equally with
equity and debt.  Additional provision was made in the Concession Agree-
ment for unanticipated project impacts and breaches of contractual
requirements to be covered, at least in part, by letters of credit, perform-
ance bonds, and insurance.  Debt financing for the project (including half
the contingencies) was provided by a number of multilateral and bilateral
agencies, export credit agencies, and a consortium of sixteen private com-
mercial banks: nine international U.S. dollar lenders and seven Thai baht
lenders.  Debt guarantees against political risks, provided by the World
Bank Group’s International Development Association, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, and the Asian Development Bank, covered
44. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 2, 9– 14.
45. Id. at 10– 15; Vincent Merme, Rhodante Ahlers & Joyeeta Gupta, Private Equity,
Public Affair: Hydropower Financing in the Mekong Basin, 24 GLOBAL ENVTL CHANGE 20,
22 (2014); Financing, NTPC: POWERING THE FUTURE, http://www.namtheun2.com/about-
ntpc/financing.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
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approximately U.S. $186 million of the dollar denominated loans.  Con-
struction was carried out under a turn-key, price-capped engineering, pro-
curement, and construction contract between NTPC and EDF.46
The Nam Theun 2 project was an exceedingly ambitious undertaking
for all involved.  Under James Wolfensohn’s leadership (from 1995 until
2005), the World Bank sought to make this project an emblematic exercise
in “Doing a Dam Better.”47  Reflecting the impact of a “post-Washington
consensus,” and the recommendations of the multi-agency World Commis-
sion on Dams, the World Bank’s Nam Theun 2 strategy was to try to “turn
the resource curse on its head”: that is, ensure better population-wide out-
comes from natural resources development than had been achieved in
other instances.48  Such an experiment would, the World Bank hoped,
answer at least some critics of the World Bank’s development paradigm,
especially with regard to dam development.49  For its part, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank sought, through the Nam Theun 2 project, to ramp up efforts
to promote a regional energy market and enhance economic cooperation
generally, within an area it had earlier designated the Greater Mekong
Subregion.50
For its proponents, including the World Bank and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, Nam Theun 2 was also to be both a marker and a guarantor of
Laos’s impending transition from a centrally planned command economy
to a market economy.51  At the same time, consistent with a neoliberal the-
sis as to the “intimate connection” between economic freedom (understood
as freedom from market-adverse state intervention) and political freedom
(understood as freedom from physical coercion), it was speculated that the
46. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 2– 5, 14– 15, 67– 68, 81– 83; Nam Theun 2
Powers Ahead, PROJECT FIN. INT’L (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.pfie.com/nam-
theun-2-powers-ahead/21073485.fullarticle; Shareholders, NTPC: POWERING THE FUTURE,
http://www.namtheun2.com/about-ntpc/shareholders.html, (last visited Apr. 22, 2015);
Nam Theun 2 Brief, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY (June 2006), http://
www.miga.org/documents/NT206.pdf. The Italian-Thai Development Public Company
Limited, an engineering and construction company listed on the Thai Stock Exchange,
originally held a fifteen percent stake in NTPC, but disposed of this in 2010, with EDF
International acquiring five percent and EGCO acquiring ten percent on top of their
respective original shareholdings: ITD Sells Shares in Nam Theun 2, INT’L WATER POWER
& DAM CONSTRUCTION (Oct. 14 2010), http://www.waterpowermagazine.com/news/
newsitd-sells-shares-in-nam-theun-2.
47. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 10– 15.
48. Id. at 34; Joseph E. Stiglitz, More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward
the Post-Washington Consensus, 19 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA POLI´TICA 94 (1999). The
“resource curse” refers to the observation that nations with an abundance of natural
resources tend to grow less slowly– and, in some accounts, show poorer economic per-
formance otherwise– than resource-poor countries. See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M.
Warner, The Curse of Natural Resources, 45 EUR. ECON. REV. 827 (2001).
49. See, e.g., Thayer Scudder, The World Commission on Dams and the Need for a New
Development Paradigm, 17 INT’L J. OF WATER RESOURCES DEV. 329 (2001).
50. Teresita Cruz-del Rosario, Opening Laos: The Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project
6– 7 (Lee Kuan Yew Sch. of Pub. Pol’y & Nat’l U. of Singapore, Working Paper No. 5,
2011), available at http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2013/05/
NATBMA_WP1105.pdf; Medhi Krongkaew, The Development of the Greater Mekong Sub-
region (GMS): Real Promise or False Hope?, 15 J. ASIAN ECON. 977, 978 (2004).
51. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 6.
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project would help “support reformers” and foster “an opening up of dia-
logue” within Laos.52
The prospect of Nam Theun 2 fostering such “dialogue” was not some-
thing that the project’s multilateral lenders were prepared to leave to
chance.  Rather, they buttressed this prospect with an elaborate supervi-
sory and consultative architecture specifically tailored to the project.  Inter-
national NGOs, CARE, and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) were
initially engaged to carry out a consultation process with those directly
affected by the project— primarily, those residing in villages earmarked for
resettlement.  Later, after criticism of that initial phase, a new consultation
methodology was developed by a “Lao-speaking Thai social scientist”
based on segmentation of participants into “culturally and ethnically com-
patible groups,” and a commitment to “talk[ing] less, listen[ing] more.”53
Alongside this, two independent expert panels were mandated by the pro-
ject’s Concession Agreement to monitor environmental and social impacts
in one case, and dam safety in the other, throughout the life of the project,
both of which report to the Lao government.54  The World Bank put in
place an international advisory group to review the project.55  This was in
addition to the monitoring and advisory roles usually assigned in connec-
tion with any cross-border project financing: independent engineers, tech-
nical, financial, environmental, and legal advisors.56
Separate financing was made available in connection with the Nam
Theun 2 project for the strengthening of public institutions responsible for
revenue and expenditure management in Laos.57  Specific, directive
arrangements were also put in place for project revenues, requiring their
sequestration in a separately-audited treasury account and their applica-
tion, exclusively, to poverty reduction efforts.58  During the project’s plan-
ning, negotiation, and development, Laos also underwent an extensive
legal reform process with the close involvement of foreign consultants,
funded under an array of bilateral and multilateral aid facilities.  A range of
Lao laws and decrees concerned with public administration, investment,
52. Id. at 7, 48. The framing of this relationship as an “intimate connection” is Fried-
man’s, FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 7– 8.
53. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 102. For accounts of the consultation
process surrounding Nam Theun 2, see Naho Mirumachi & Jacopo Torriti, The Use of
Public Participation and Economic Appraisal for Public Involvement in Large-Scale Hydro-
power Projects: Case Study of the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project, 47 ENERGY POL’Y 125,
128– 30 (2012) and, more critically, Sarinda Singh, World Bank-directed Development?
Negotiating Participation in the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos, 40 DEV. &
CHANGE 487 (2009).
54. Shannon Lawrence, The Nam Theun 2 Controversy and its Lessons for Laos, in
CONTESTED WATERSCAPES IN THE MEKONG REGION: HYDROPOWER, LIVELIHOODS AND GOVERN-
ANCE, 81, 91– 92 (Franc¸ois Molle et al. eds., 2009).
55. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 12, 19, 26, 51, 71.
56. See generally E.R. YERSCOMBE, PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE 34– 38 (2013).
57. WORLD BANK, LAOS - NAM THEUN 2 HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT: REVENUE AND EXPEN-
DITURE MANAGEMENT (2005), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
2005/03/15762819/lao-pdr-nam-theun-2-hydroelectric-project-revenue-expenditure-
management.
58. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 37– 41.
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property, natural resources, and environmental protection can be traced,
directly or indirectly, to the Nam Theun 2 project.59  At the time of its
financial closing in 2005, Nam Theun 2 seemed poised to ignite a wide-
ranging process of state and non-state transformation, as Michael
Goldman suggested in 2001:
Teaming up with international mega-fauna and biodiversity conservation-
ists, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN), Worldwide Fund for
Nature (WWF), and Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), the World Bank
and its partners are linking hydro-electric dam and transmission financing
to an ambitious string of conservation and protected areas, mega-fauna run-
ning corridors, watershed conservation sites, eco-tourism projects, biodiver-
sity research and development sites, and indigenous peoples’ extractive
reserves.  Roads, markets, experimental farms, Lao-language schools, health
clinics, and workshops in agronomy, resource management, family hygiene,
and birth control, comprise the proliferating list of social projects that are
part of the package.60
This might all sound rather more like “liberal legalism” than neoliber-
alism, but the broad rationale for these arrangements remained, for the
most part, an economic one— specifically a competitive capitalist, market-
oriented one— even in the context of an otherwise centrally planned econ-
omy.61  These measures were not established with the primary goals of
securing individual or collective rights or enlarging political freedoms,
although such aims may well have been held among those involved in the
program.  Rather, these measures were typically cast, by champions of
Nam Theun 2, as promoting the Lao state’s “advancement” towards fuller
participation in regional and global markets.  Improved credentials sur-
rounding “transparency, management, and accountability of economic
resources” were justified as likely to boost Laos’s capacity to “unlock[ ] the
potential” of its unexploited riparian resources in the medium- to long-term
(the region being one with “the lowest percentage of exploited hydropower
of any region in the world”).  The “improvements” outlined above were
designed, on the whole, to equip Laos to compete more successfully in
59. Michael Goldman, Constructing an Environmental State: Eco-governmentality and
Other Transnational Practices of a “Green” World Bank, 48 SOC. PROBS. 499, 506– 510
(2001); Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 54– 61, 161– 63; WORLD BANK, UPDATE
ON THE LAO PDR NAM THEUN 2 (NT2) HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 6– 7 (2006), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/NT2oct06_EngVersion.pdf.
60. Goldman, supra note 59, at 506.
61. The term “liberal legalism” is borrowed from Amy Cohen and William Simon,
who use it to “approximate” a “cluster of ideas” and institutional ideal types associated
with rights-based political liberalism. Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and
Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 358, 360 n. 10
(2010); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge
to Liberal Legalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 127 (2004). Wendy Brown sharpens
political liberalism, and distinguishes it from economic liberalism (whether classical or
neoliberal) as follows: “In the history of political thought, while individual liberty
remains a touchstone, liberalism signifies an order in which the state exists to secure the
freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis. A liberal political order may har-
bor either liberal or Keynesian economic policies.” Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43,
at 3.
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global capital markets and to make fuller use of the “strategic advantage” it
was understood to enjoy in the regional energy market, as a producer of
relatively low-cost electricity.62
Insofar as its own goals were concerned, the Nam Theun 2 project
posed considerable challenges for the Government of Laos, steered by the
only legal political party in the country: the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party.  It sought to enter global capital markets with no prior history of
commercial indebtedness and a limited record of effecting public-private
partnerships (Nam Theun 2 would be its third such partnership and, at the
time, its largest).63  It did so at a time when it enjoyed potential eligibility
for Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt relief— hardly an incentive to pro-
spective financiers.64  Its immediate aim was to finance a hydropower
development plan that would cost an amount equal to more than half its
2005 gross domestic product (GDP).65  This it saw as crucial to the realiza-
tion of its stated “vision for . . . achiev[ing] middle-income status by
2020.”66  To achieve this, the Lao Government was said to have recognized
the need to “transform . . . international perceptions and confidence in its
efforts by strengthening its track record.”67  Its reported goal was to do so,
however, without submitting to “overly intrusive conditions.”68
From a financial perspective, the Nam Theun 2 project has been highly
successful.  Its economics have proven unusually robust, yielding excellent
returns for investors.69  This has undoubtedly been a factor in Laos’
impressive GDP growth of late: the country has recorded annual GDP
growth averaging seven percent between 1999 and 2012.70  In terms of its
ability to deliver on a neoliberal reform agenda in Laos or the Mekong River
Basin, however, this project has been a failure, as will be explained in Part
III below.
62. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 6– 7.
63. Id. at 161.
64. On Lao’s inclusion on the list of countries eligible for heavily indebted poor
country relief until 2011, see Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multi-
lateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)— Statistical Update, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
6– 7, 9 (2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/110811.pdf;
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI) –  Statistical Update, International Monetary Fund, December 19, 2013, 6, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/121913.pdf.
65. World Statistics Pocketbook: Lao People’s Democratic Republic, U.N. Statistics Divi-
sion (2013), available at http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=lao%20People
’s%20Democratic%20Republic.
66. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 158; Diana Suhardiman & Mark Gior-
dano, Legal Plurality: An Analysis of Power Interplay in Mekong Hydropower, 104 ANNALS
OF ASSOC. OF AMER. GEOGRAPHERS 973, 982 (2014).
67. Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 157.
68. Id. at 42.
69. JEFF BALL ET AL., REVIEW OF NAM THEUN 2 HYDROELECTRIC DAM, LAO PDR: FINAL
REPORT TO AUSAID 13– 14 (2005) (on file with author); Porter & Shivakumar, supra note
43, at 88.
70. Jayant Menon & Peter Warr, The Lao Economy: Capitalizing on Natural Resources
Exports, 8 ASIAN ECON. POL’Y REV. 70 (2013).
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If Nam Theun 2 failed, though, it “failed forward” into a successor—
another quite different, hybrid product of state and non-state reform agen-
das— the Xayaburi project.  Like a precocious, style-conscious progeny of
serious-minded parents, Xayaburi is far more expensive, far more stream-
lined in legal and financial structure, and far more audaciously located
(given predicted downstream impacts) on the Mekong River mainstream.71
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank— as well as the wide-
ranging reform agenda that accompanied Nam Theum 2— are notably
absent from the Xayaburi project’s financing; debt financing for the project
has been raised from five Thai commercial banks (one of them state-
owned) and the Export Import Bank of Thailand.72  The economic ratio-
nale for this project rests again with the rising appetites of Thai energy
consumers, associated with industrialization and urbanization, as was the
case in Nam Theun 2.73  Yet Xayaburi represents a very different incarna-
tion of the neoliberal experiment to its forebear, Nam Theun 2.
Located in northern Laos, Xayaburi is designed as a 33-meter high,
820-meter long concrete gravity dam located on the mainstream of the
Mekong River.  It will be the first hydroelectric dam to be constructed on
the Mekong River mainstream outside of China.74  The project includes
development of a 1,285 MW power plant that will export approximately
1,225 MW of electricity to Thailand, under a take-or-pay power purchase
agreement with the state-owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thai-
land (EGAT), and supply about 60 MW to the state-owned Electricite´ du
Laos (EDL) for Lao consumption.75  The special purpose vehicle created
for the project, and the beneficiary of twenty-nine year concession from the
Lao Government entitling it to build, own, and operate the project and then
transfer it back to the state at the end of the concession term, is the
Xayaburi Power Company Limited (XPC).76  XPC is a limited liability com-
pany created under Lao law and is fifty percent owned by Ch. Karnchang
Public Company Limited (CKPCL, a general construction and infrastruc-
ture development company publicly listed on the Thai Stock Exchange);
71. Claudia Kuenzer et al., Understanding the Impact of Hydropower Developments in
the Context of Upstream– Downstream Relations in the Mekong River Basin, 8 SUS-
TAINABILITY SCI. 565, 571– 72 (2013).
72. Natee Synergy, Xayaburi Hydropower Project, PTT (Feb. 8, 2014), http://
ptt.listedcompany.com/misc/PRESN/20140208-PTT-analystSiteVisit.pdf [hereinafter
PTT Analysts Report].
73. Darryl S. Jarvis, Institutional Processes and Regulatory Risk: A Case Study of the
Thai Energy Sector, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE, 175, 181 (2010).
74. Ch. Karnchang Pub. Company Limited, Feasibility Study: Xayaburi Hydroelec-
tric Power Project, Lao PDR (2010).
75. See id.
76. Pisit Changplayngam & Kettiya Jittapong, Work Restarts at Xayaburi Dam in
Laos— Project Leader, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
08/16/entertainment-us-thailand-laos-xayaburi-idUSBRE87F09H20120816. Note, how-
ever, that the Concession Agreement term is described as thirty years in the Feasibility
Study cited id. at I-1, and in the following document: Mekong River Commission Secreta-
riat, Prior Consultation Project Review Report, MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION 5, 10 (2011),
http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Reports/PC-Proj-Review-Report-
Xaiyaburi-24-3-11.pdf.
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twenty-five percent owned by Natee Synergy (an investment holding com-
pany that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Global Power Synergy Company
Limited, itself a wholly owned subsidiary of PTT Public Company Limited,
an outcome of the privatization of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand, the
latter now listed on the Thai Stock Exchange, but in which the Thai Gov-
ernment retains the largest shareholding); thirteen percent owned by Elec-
tricity Generating Public Company Limited (EGCO, a publicly listed
company on the Thai Stock Exchange incorporated by EGAT and in which
EGAT retains a shareholding of approximately twenty-five percent); seven
percent owned by Bangkok Expressway (a company listed on the Thai
Stock Exchange); and five percent owned by P.T. Construction and Irriga-
tion Company Limited (a Lao-based company).77  The project cost of about
U.S. $3.8 billion is to be funded with approximately seventy-one percent
debt and twenty-nine percent equity.78  Debt financing for the project is
comprised of approximately 88 billion Thai baht (about U.S. $2.7 billion)
in syndicated loans provided by five Thai private commercial banks— Bang-
kok Bank, Kasikorn Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, and
TISCO Bank— and a loan guarantee from the Export Import Bank of Thai-
land.79  As in Nam Theun 2, the Concession Agreement makes provision
for unanticipated project impacts and breaches of contractual requirements
to be covered, at least in part, by letters of credit, performance bonds, and
insurance.80  Construction is being carried out under a turn-key, price-
capped engineering, procurement, and construction contract between XPC
and Ch. Karnchang (Lao) Company Limited, a subsidiary of CKPCL.81
Given its location on the Mekong River mainstream, Xayaburi has been
subject to a process of inter-governmental consultation pursuant to the
1995 Mekong Agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet-
nam.82  Article 1 of the Mekong Agreement requires parties to “cooperate
77. It has been reported that PTT Public Company Limited plans to sell between
twenty-five percent and thirty percent of the shares of Global Power Synergy Company
Limited in an initial public offering on the Thai Stock Exchange in 2014. Company Over-
view of Global Power Synergy Company Limited, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/
snapshot.asp?privcapId=30328918.
78. See Minutes of the Shareholder Ordinary General Meeting, TISCO Fin. Group Pub.
Company Limited 4– 5 (2013), http://www.tisco.co.th/AttachFileAction.do?fileName
=TFG_minutes%202013%20AGM_E.pdf.
79. PTT Analysts Report, supra note 72; Minutes of the Shareholder Ordinary General
Meeting, TISCO Fin. Group Pub. Company Limited 4– 5 (2013), http://www.tisco.co.th/
AttachFileAction.do?fileName=TFG_minutes%202013%20AGM_E.pdf.
80. Interview with Xaypaseuth Phomsoupha, Director-General, Department of
Energy Business, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Laos (Nov. 20, 2012) (on file with
author).
81. CK Karnchang Secures Deal for Hydropower Plant in Laos, THE NATION MUL-
TIMEDIA (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Ch-
Karnchang-secures-deal-for-hydropower-plant-in— 30212617.html; Company Overview of
Global Power Synergy Company Limited, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 24, 2015), http:/
/investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=303289
18.
82. MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION, AGREEMENT ON THE COOPERATION FOR THE SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN (1995) [hereinafter Mekong Agreement].
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in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and con-
servation of the water and related resources of the Mekong River Basin”
including in relation to hydropower.83  Article 5 of the Mekong Agreement
requires parties to ensure that “notification” is provided and “prior consul-
tation” conducted in relation to any intra-basin use of water (within the
Joint Committee established under the Agreement, with representation
from each participating riparian state).84  Articles 25 and 26 of the Agree-
ment authorize the promulgation of procedures in this regard.85  In Novem-
ber 2003, the Mekong River Commission (the MRC, established under the
Mekong Agreement) approved Procedures for Notification, Prior Consulta-
tion, and Agreement (PNPCA) among the parties to the Agreement in
respect of utilization and development of the Mekong River mainstream.86
In August 2005, the MRC adopted guidelines to the implementation of the
PNPCA.87  The PNPCA process was put into operation for the first time, in
September 2010, when the Government of Lao PDR gave formal notice to
the MRC Joint Committee of its proposal to proceed with the Xayaburi pro-
ject’s development.  In 2014, the Australian Government— a provider of
funding to assist implementation of the PNPCA— summarized the observa-
tions of analysts from whom it had commissioned a review of this process
as follows:
The formal process for the Xayaburi PNPCA has involved submission of docu-
ments, working group meetings, national consultations, deliberations by the
MRC Joint Committee and finally a decision by the MRC Council . . . The
total process has been more complicated and has also included bilateral dis-
cussions, the launching and subsequent debate catalyzed by the mainstream
dams Strategic Environmental Assessment, extensive lobbying by developers
and concerned scientists, the Save the Mekong Campaign, film-making and
media reporting.88
For background on the Mekong Agreement, see Greg Browder, An Analysis of the Negotia-
tions for the 1995 Mekong Agreement, 5 INT’L NEGOTIATION 237 (2000); Greg Browder &
Leonard Ortolono, The Evolution of an International Water Resources Management Regime
in the Mekong River Basin, 40 NAT. RESOURCES L. J. 499 (2000).
83. Mekong Agreement, supra note 82, at 3.
84. Id. at 3– 4.
85. Id. at 8.
86. MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION, PROCEDURES FOR NOTIFICATION, PRIOR CONSULTATION
AND AGREEMENT (2003) [hereinafter PNPCA]. On the PNPCA process, see R. Edward
Grumbine et al., Mekong Hydropower: Drivers of Change and Governance Challenges, 10
FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENV’T 91, 95– 96 (2012); Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Notification
and Consultation Procedures Under the Mekong Agreement: Insights from the Xayaburi Con-
troversy, 5 ASIAN J. OF INT’L L. 143, 150– 52 (2015).
87. PNPCA, supra note 86.
88. Letter from Julia Niblett, Assistant Sec’y, Mekong, Philippines, and Burma Dev.
Branch of the Austl. Gov’t Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Pianporn Deetes, Thai-
land Campaign Coordinator, Int’l Rivers, (April 1, 2014), available at http://
www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/responseausaid.pdf. The MRC Council
is the main decision-making body of the MRC and is composed, under Article 15 of the
Mekong Agreement, of a representative from each participating riparian state at ministe-
rial or cabinet level. Mekong Agreement, supra note 82. The Strategic Environmental
Assessment is a study that was commissioned by the MRC in 2010 to assess the cumula-
tive environmental impacts, costs, and benefits of hydropower development proposed for
the Mekong River mainstream: ICEM (INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
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The consultation process conducted as part of PNPCA implementa-
tion, and monitoring architecture otherwise installed around Xayaburi,
both differ very markedly from their Nam Theun 2 corollaries.  Most nota-
bly, consultations were convened in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam
regarding Xayaburi, but no public consultation at all was conducted within
Laos in relation to this project.89  Negotiation and dialogue appears to have
been conducted almost exclusively at the government-to-government level,
with mediation and some intervention by the MRC.90  Efforts made in
Nam Theun 2 to release project-related information to the Lao public, in
some instances in the Lao language, have not been replicated in
Xayaburi.91  Expert input on the Xayaburi project was solicited via a group
of fisheries and sediment experts, assembled to support the PNPCA Task
Group of the MRC Secretariat.92  A Thai consulting firm, TEAM Consult-
ing Engineering and Management Company Limited, conducted environ-
mental and social impact analyses for the Lao Government, and an
international engineering consulting firm, Po¨yry, delivered a further report
to the Lao Government on the project’s responsiveness to concerns raised
by the MRC and other MRC countries.93  However, no provision was made
for independent review of the Xayaburi project’s performance, and its
social and environmental impacts on an ongoing basis.  Likewise, there
seems to have been no agreement to specify any particular handling of pro-
ject revenues (beyond the direction of funds through certain accounts
earmarked for debt service pursuant to financing agreements), nor do
funds appear to have been made available for public sector institutional
development or law reform in connection with the project.  One official
estimated that compensation for resettled communities, plus local govern-
ment development funding to be provided in connection with the Xayaburi
project, would be on the order of U.S. $48 million.94  An annex to the Con-
cession Agreement for Xayaburi reportedly includes requirements as to
minimum income levels that resettled communities must achieve within
five years of resettlement, by reference to a baseline income level deter-
mined before the project’s commencement.95  Compliance with these
requirements is, however, to be monitored by the Lao Government itself,
AGEMENT), STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF HYDROPOWER ON THE MEKONG MAIN-
STREAM— FINAL REPORT (2010). The Save the Mekong campaign was reportedly started in
2009 in Vietnam, to oppose hydropower development on the Lower Mekong River main-
stream. Thomas Fuller, Dams and Development Threaten the Mekong, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
2009, at A16.
89. Niblett, supra note 88.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Rieu-Clarke, supra note 86, at 152.
93. See id. at 152– 54.
94. Interview with senior Lao Government official (Nov. 22, 2012) (on file with
author).
95. Interview with Xaypaseuth Phomsoupha, Director-General, Department of
Energy Business, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Laos (Nov. 20, 2012) (on file with
author).
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not through independent overseers of the kind authorized in relation to
Nam Theun 2.96
In interviews conducted in 2012, Lao Government officials made clear
that they regarded the wide-ranging reformist interventions and external
oversight of Nam Theun 2 as no longer appropriate to Laos’s situation, in
light of its now proven track record of creditworthiness.  Xaypaseuth Phom-
soupha, Director-General of the Department of Energy Business in the Min-
istry of Energy and Mines in Laos, referred to the Nam Theun 2
Concession Agreement as a “second generation” agreement, the scope of
which had been expanded well beyond that agreed in the Theun Hinboun
project, to meet the “requirement[s] of international private funders.”
“After the success of Nam Theun 2,” the official continued, “we move[d] to
the third generation [that is, the Xayaburi Concession Agreement]. . . . The
concession of Nam Theun 2 is too complicated and it is very difficult, even
for well trained lawyers to understand. We have to make it easy.”97
Another senior Lao Government representative lamented the time and
expense associated with consultation and negotiation.  Reflecting on the
experience of consulting with neighboring countries regarding the
Xayaburi project since 2010, this representative remarked:
For me what we want to see from this experience of going through it for the
last two or three years, I like to see agreement that I think is practical and to
be implemented, not an agreement so then . . .  we then have to spend a lot of
money on the lawyers.98
As much as it embodies a relatively pared-back, non-consultative
model of project development, Xayaburi seems also to signal a new expan-
sion and intensification of hydropower in Laos.  According to the Director-
General of the Energy Business Department of the Lao Government, as of
January 2012, it was one of ten hydropower projects under construction in
Laos with private financing.99  Others claim that some sixty dams— indeed,
up to seventy dams— are being planned in Laos, including nine on the
Mekong mainstream.100  The Mekong River Commission Secretariat con-
templates seventy-one tributary hydropower schemes operating in the
Mekong River Basin by 2030 and reports that eleven dams have been pro-
96. See id. For a limited insight into community resettlement plans being imple-
mented in connection with Xayaburi, see Po¨yry, Xayaburi Hydropower Project Progress
Update, Dec. 2013, available at http://laoenergy.la/admin/upload_free/cb0bfaff9558
d1d767476cca252b287db01489d896530d59f21b32b60061690d8a0caa7a48c9c16ab
901cf1da8a9c74611.Xayaburi%20Status%20Dec%202013.pdf.
97. Interview with Xaypaseuth Phomsoupha, Director-General, Department of
Energy Business, Ministry of Energy and Mines, in Laos (Nov. 20, 2012) (on file with
author).
98. Interview with senior Lao Government official (Nov. 22, 2012) (on file with
author).
99. Xaypaseuth Phomsoupha, Project Financing in Laos’ Hydropower for Export of
Electricity to Thailand, 10 HYDRO NEPAL: J. WATER, ENERGY & ENV’T 7,7 (2012).
100. Nathanial Matthews, Water Grabbing in the Mekong River Basin - An Analysis of
the Winners and Losers of Thailand’s Hydropower Development in Lao PDR, 5 WATER
ALTERNATIVES 392, 392– 93 (2012); Porter & Shivakumar, supra note 43, at 158.
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posed for the Lower Mekong River mainstream, including six dams in Lao
territory.101
III. Friedman’s Neoliberal Legality in Two Lao Experiments
Nam Theun 2 and Xayaburi were cast above as neoliberal experi-
ments— a move quite common among critics of development practice in
Laos.  Geographer Keith Barney has argued, for example, that “a form of
‘frontier-neoliberalism’” is under assembly in Laos.102  It is important to
recognize, nonetheless, that the story of the two Lao dam projects
described above is partially a story of resistance to neoliberal policy think-
ing.  EGAT, the primary purchaser of electricity from both these projects,
was earmarked for privatization in the late 1980s, pursuant to structural
adjustment loan conditions attached to IMF and World Bank financing.103
EGAT’s privatization, however, was resisted by a coalition of labor unions,
consumer groups, Thai nationalists, and academics, compounding the
effect of EGAT’s own longstanding political patronage.104  Legislative pro-
vision made in the late 1990s for public-private partnerships in the Thai
energy sector represented a compromise on this front, made in light of
EGAT’s precarious debt position.  But EGAT has retained significant share-
holdings in all the partnerships so authorized, including EGCO, effectively
maintaining its monopoly position.105  Laos, too, can be seen as having
held out against neoliberal imperatives, to some extent.  Despite having
adopted a range of reforms since the late 1980s consistent with movement
to a market economy, Laos has largely withstood repeated demands from
the IMF that it tighten its fiscal policy by, among other things, rationalizing
public expenditure.106
It is possible, nonetheless, to assimilate both the Nam Theun 2 and
Xayaburi projects to a paradigm of neoliberal legality advanced in Milton
Friedman’s 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom.107  Friedman’s text is by
101. Mekong River Commission Secretariat, supra note 76, at 5.
102. Keith Barney, Laos and the Making of a ‘Relational’ Resource Frontier, 175 GEOG.
J. 146, 146 (2009).
103. See IMF, Thailand letter of Intent and Memorandum on Economic Policies, Feb-
ruary 24, 1998, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/022498.htm.
104. Jarvis, supra note 73, at 183; see Suppanika Wattana, Deepak Sharma & Ron-
nakorn Vaiayvuth, Electricity Industry Reforms in Thailand: A Historical Review, 2
GMSARN INT’L J. 41, 43 (2008).
105. See Pronchai Wisuttisak, Regulation and Competition Issues in Thai Electricity Sec-
tor, 44 ENERGY POL’Y, 185, 186 (2012).
106. See, e.g., Ben Bingham, Lao P.D.R.: Assessment Letter for the Asian Development
Bank and World Bank, IMF Policy Papers (Aug. 15, 2005), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/NP/pp/eng/2006/081505.pdf (calling for “expenditure restraint”
and “fiscal discipline”); see IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2010 Article IV Consulta-
tion with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, IMF Public Information Notice (PIN) No.
11/12 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/
pn1112.htm (criticizing “[e]xpansionary fiscal and monetary policies”); IMF, IMF Exec-
utive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Lao People’s Democratic Repub-
lic, IMF Press Release No. 13/472 (Nov. 26, 2013), available at https://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13472.htm (calling for “a more ambitious tightening”).
107. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 15.
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no means the most sophisticated or developed example of neoliberal think-
ing about law.  Friedrich Hayek, in particular, put forward a far fuller and
more nuanced account of law as an “instrument of production” in a market
economy, indicative of his university education in law.108  It is, neverthe-
less, a claim of this Article that the very schematism of Friedman’s charac-
terization of law— what I will later characterize as its modularity—
accounts, in part, for its resilience.  In Friedman’s account, law is to be
both the unerring guarantor of baseline conditions for the market to oper-
ate, and a mechanism to ensure the “wide[r] dispers[al]” of economic
power in the interests of competitive freedom.109  A push-me-pull-you set of
impulses towards law more or less along these lines has played out in the
two Lao projects described above, albeit quite differently in each case.  This
section will now focus on these ambivalent legal dynamics, beginning with
an overview of Friedman’s model of legality.
Friedman’s model of legality is just that— a model— as Part IV will
explore further.110  It is, accordingly, possible to enumerate its features
quite schematically.  First, Friedman equated law primarily with govern-
ment.  Indeed, only in the later chapters of the book Capitalism and Free-
dom does Friedman favor the terms law, legislation, or regulation at all;
early chapters refer solely to “institutional arrangements” and “govern-
ment.”  In Friedman’s account, governments are the primary institutions
that constitute and deploy lawful authority; virtually everything else is
choice.  Law in Friedman’s work is thus, first and foremost, public law, his
prioritization of contracts notwithstanding.  The exposition of private
law’s making and operation in Capitalism and Freedom is extremely scant.
Private law entails only the exercise of freedom within the “rules of the
108. See HAYEK, THE ROAD, supra note 22, at 55 (“[Formal rules] could almost be
described as a kind of instrument of production, helping people to predict the behavior
of those with whom they must collaborate, rather than as efforts towards the satisfaction
of particular needs”). See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, I LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY:
RULES AND ORDER (1973). On Hayek’s education at the University of Vienna in law and
political science, see ALAN O. EBENSTEIN, FRIEDRICH HAYEK: A BIOGRAPHY 28, 38 (2003).
Ebenstein remarks that “[h]is focus in time became rules, or law” (at 99).
109. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 15– 16.
110. Model, n. and adj. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015), available at http://
www.oed.com/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015): “A representation of structure, and related
senses . . . A three-dimensional representation, esp. on a small scale, of a person or thing
or of a projected or existing structure . . . An object of imitation.” Writing of economic
modeling, Allan Gibbard and Hal R. Varian maintained that “a model is involved when-
ever there is economic reasoning from exactly specified premises . . . . The story [told by
a model] may be vague . . . [but] [t]he structure itself must be specified with the preci-
sion needed for mathematical reasoning . . . . All economic models have this, at least, in
common: a model poses a question of the form, ‘What would happen if such and such
were the case?’ in such a way that it can be answered deductively.” Allan Gibbard and
Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, 75 J. OF PHIL. 664, 666– 68 (1978). See generally Mary S.
Morgan & Margaret Morrison, Introduction, in MODELS AS MEDIATORS: PERSPECTIVES ON
NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1, 10 (Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison eds., 1999);
Mary S. Morgan & Margaret Morrison, Models as Mediating Instruments, in MODELS AS
MEDIATORS: PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 10 (Mary S. Morgan and Mar-
garet Morrison eds., 1999).
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game.”111  Friedman’s book takes no account of Robert Hale’s early-to-mid-
20th century studies of private coercion in law, or other contemporaneous
developments in private law theory.112  Similarly, no account is taken of
private law-making in modes in which choice is subordinated to contrac-
tual boilerplate, standard forms, or the replication of “financeable” deal
structures.113
The work of law, for Friedman, is the production and consumption of
a background level of conformity, in reliance on which people can enter
into economic arrangements of their own choosing, with the latter viewed
solely through an economic lens.  “It is desirable . . . that we use govern-
ment to provide a general legal and economic framework that will enable
individuals to produce growth in the economy, if that is in accord with
their values,” Friedman observes.114 Friedman’s concern with law extends,
in this mode, to the “maintenance of law and order,” which Friedman
equates to the prevention of “physical coercion of one individual by
another.”115  It also extends well beyond that— to laws requiring and mak-
ing some provision for children to receive a minimum amount of general
schooling, for instance, which “add[ ] to the economic value of the stu-
dent.”116  As for powers of non-physical coercion, or coercion by state
agencies or corporate intermediaries, Friedman would have us address
these only to the extent that they correlate with market monopoly,
“whether enterprise monopoly or labor monopoly,” both of which should
be subject to antitrust laws in his view.117  Even then, some monopolies are
tolerable for Friedman, with “private monopoly . . . be[ing] the least of
the[se] evils” because of its “shortrun effects.”118  So long as government
delivers effectively on its law and order promise (so understood) Friedman
is happy to leave issues of state-sponsored or privately held concentrations
of power to the hand of history, his “fundamental[ ] fearful[ness] of con-
111. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 15.
112. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State,
38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 474 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Lib-
erty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 626 (1943).
113. Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 245
(2008); FLEUR JOHNS, NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNRULY LAW 109– 152 (2013)
[hereinafter NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW].
114. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 38.
115. Id. at 14. Friedman also included the following among the government functions
that he regarded as legitimate: “defin[ing] property rights, serv[ing] as a means whereby
we could modify property rights and other rules of the economic game, adjudicat[ing]
disputes about the interpretation of the rules, enforc[ing] contracts, promot[ing] compe-
tition, provid[ing] a monetary framework, engag[ing] in activities to counter technical
monopolies and to overcome neighborhood effects widely regarded as sufficiently
important to justify government intervention, and . . . supplement[ing] private charity
and the private family in protecting the irresponsible, whether madman or child.” Id. at
34.
116. Id. at 88; see id. at 85– 107.
117. Id. at 132.
118. Id. at 28– 29. On the neoliberal reformulation of classical liberal doctrine with
respect to monopoly, see Rob Van Horn, Reinventing Monopoly and the Role of Corpora-
tions, in THE ROAD FROM MONT PE`LERIN, supra note 20, at 204.
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centrated power” notwithstanding.119  Musing on how to effect “radical
change in the structure of [non-democratic] society,” Friedman suggests
that one must rely on efforts of “persuasion” financed by “a few wealthy
individuals” acting in “the role of the patron,” as well as on the “almost
inevitable” power-dispersing effects of the market.120
In the midst of power-dispersal, Friedman sees law playing a second
key role: in the mode of an “umpire to interpret and enforce the rules
decided on,” including through the “mediat[ion] [of] differences among us
on the meaning of the rules.”121  This sense of law is, however, even less
developed than Friedman’s account of law as government.  At times it is
blurry and diffuse, with legal norms and institutions comprising part of a
“general customary and legal framework” designed to enable “decision-
makers . . . [to] tak[e] into account the cumulative consequences of . . .
policy as a whole.”122  At other times, it is almost caricatured in the perfect
coherence and uniformity of its arbitral operation.  Friedman acknowl-
edges that legal rights are “complex social creations rather than self-evi-
dent propositions.”123  Nonetheless, he expresses na¨ıve horror at the
prospect that “[c]ontracts entered into in good faith and with full knowl-
edge on the part of both parties to them [might be] declared invalid for the
benefit of one of the parties!”124  Yet, despite its near-perfection in Fried-
man’s account, the role of law as a mediation machine is still secondary;
primacy is given to the role of the market in allowing people to circumvent
injustice.125  Where law falls short in mediating conflict, abundance
comes to the rescue.  In Friedman’s telling, there are almost always multi-
ple, competing routes available to detour around discrimination, oppres-
sion, or exploitation.  Consumers are to be protected by the presence of
other sellers, sellers by the presence of other consumers, employees by the
presence of other employers, and so on.126
In Laos, the Nam Theun 2 project gave life to these two rather mis-
matched versions of law: first, in its creation of a tailored legal environ-
ment around the project through purpose-built legislative initiatives,
regulatory exemptions, and government undertakings; and second, in the
architecture of monitoring and mediation it installed.
The investment that NTPC shareholders committed to make in the
Nam Theun 2 project was of such duration (twenty-five years) as is com-
monly understood in finance markets to “require” contractual assurances
and other guarantees of legal stability.127  Consistent with this expecta-
119. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 39.
120. Id. at 16– 17.
121. Id. at 15, 25.
122. Id. at 25, 53.
123. Id. at 26.
124. Id. at 60.
125. Id. at 108– 09.
126. Id. at 14– 15.
127. On the idea of the market itself having certain “requirements” or issuing certain
demands, see NON-LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 113, at 139. On the his-
tory of including stabilization clauses in agreements between states and foreign inves-
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tion— and with Friedman’s vision of law affording a “framework” condu-
cive to the maintenance of “voluntary cooperation” among actors engaged
in economic activity128— the Nam Theun 2 project’s Lao-law-governed Con-
cession Agreement included a contractual undertaking by the Lao Govern-
ment that it would not amend Lao law or regulation in such a way as to
cause project costs to increase or project revenues to decrease by amounts
in excess of certain thresholds.  Should the Lao Government introduce any
such change in law, it may exempt the company from its scope or will be
liable to compensate NTPC.  The Concession Agreement has also obligated
the Lao Government to procure for the benefit of NTPC and its associates
all Lao regulatory approvals required for the project, and to maintain them
without amendment or revocation except in accordance with their
terms.129
In the Agreement, NTPC was afforded water rights, rights of access to
public roads, rights of import and export, and rights of access to use and
possession of land.130  The company and certain of its contractors were
granted exemptions from a range of Lao taxes and duties, but the company
was still required to pay a lump sum upon grant of the concession, a profit
tax, and a resource usage charge in accordance with the Concession Agree-
ment.131  The “umpire” (in Friedman’s terms) for all these contractual
undertakings was located outside the Lao court system; disputes between
the Lao Government and NTPC arising under the Concession Agreement
are referable to a specially convened “Consultation and Dispute Commit-
tee,” an “Expert,” or an arbitral panel assembled under UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion Rules with the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Chairman
wielding appointment authority.132  These covenants were reinforced by
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency’s, the World Bank’s, and the
Asian Development Bank’s provision of political risk coverage to lenders to
the project in respect of any breach by the Lao Government of its contrac-
tual obligations leading to an arbitral award against the Government which
tors, see Timothy B. Hansen, The Legal Effect Given Stabilization Clauses in Economic
Development Agreements, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 1015, 1023 (1987); Joseph Nwaokoro, Enforc-
ing Stabilization of International Energy Contracts, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 103, 105
(remarking on these clauses having been “robustly debated in the 1970s and 1980s”);
Doak R. Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a
Lex Petrolea, OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. J. (OGEL) 2, 18 (2002), available at www.ogel.org/
article.asp?key=2366 (tracing these clauses to post-World War I investment by the US in
Latin America in the aftermath of a series of nationalizations).
128. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 13.
129. Memorandum of Legal Issues in Relation to the Concession Agreement from
O¨zgu¨r Can & Sheldon Leader, Human Rights Centre, Essex U., to Mekong Watch (May
30, 2005), available at http://mekongwatch.org/PDF/ca_analysisfinal.pdf; Nam Theun 2
Hydroelectric Project: Summary of the Concession Agreement between the Government
of the Lao PDR and the Nam Theun 2 Power Company Limited as of November 2005,
available at http://www.namtheun2.com/documents/project-documents/118.html
[hereinafter Concession Agreement Summary].
130. Concession Agreement Summary, supra note 129, at 7– 9, 12.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id. at 14, 15, 20.
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the covered lenders could not enforce within a specified period.133
The Power Purchase Agreement between EGAT and the NTPC, gov-
erned by English law, is similarly designed to encase the project in a frame-
work of stability and privately arbitrated dispute resolution.  It obligated
both parties to construct their respective facilities by specified dates with a
view to the project becoming commercially operational in a timely man-
ner.134  Thereafter, NTPC agreed to sell its power exclusively to EGAT (or
EDL, under its counterpart agreement, or any wholesale Thai electricity
market into which EGAT may decide to integrate NTPC) in exchange for
which EGAT agreed to pay a tariff calculated in accordance with a pre-
determined formula for the twenty-five year term of the Agreement, on a
take-or-pay basis.  NTPC’s obligations to EGAT under the power purchase
agreement were secured by a number of Thai bank guarantees or cash
deposits, and a mortgage over NTPC’s physical assets.135  In a similar fash-
ion to the Concession Agreement, the power purchase agreement provided
for dispute resolution by a standing committee of party representatives, a
panel of three experts, or through arbitration in Singapore under UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules.136  The Government of Laos also made certain
undertakings to EGAT directly in a related agreement.137 Alongside this,
Thailand and Laos entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regard-
ing the provision of future electricity supplies to Thailand, as a successor to
earlier memoranda on this theme.138
In these ways, and by virtue of the surrounding law reform measures
to which reference was made in Part II, a specially designed jurisdictional
field was demarcated around the Nam Theun 2 project, the legal features of
which do not correspond to the situation of any other company, individ-
ual, or agency in Lao PDR.  This is a hybrid creation of Lao public law (a
range of legislative instruments and decrees) and private law (contract)
that, in both its public and private law dimensions, leans on or borrows
from international legal regimes of various kinds (including multilateral
financial institutions’ political risk guarantees, UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, and bilateral memoranda of understanding).  By virtue of an annex
to the Concession Agreement specifying social impact mitigation, resettle-
ment terms, and resettlement compensation that NTPC would provide to
residents in resettled villages, those residents were also brought within the
scope of the project’s distinct jurisdiction and the life conditions author-
133. MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, supra note 46; Cruz-Del Rosario,
supra note 50, at 10.
134. Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project: The EGAT Power Purchase Agreement: Sum-
mary for Public Disclosure, at 3, available at http://www.namtheun2.com/documents/
project-documents/118.html [hereinafter Power Purchase Agreement Summary].
135. Id. at 9.
136. Id. at 14.
137. Id. at 1. Economic Consulting Associates, The Potential of Regional Power Sector
Integration: Nam Theun 2, Generation Case Study (July 2009), available at http://
www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/BN004-10_REISP-CD_Nam%20Theun%202-
Generation.pdf.
138. Cruz-Del Rosario, supra note 50, at 9; Economic Consulting Associates, supra
note 137, at 2.
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ized or inaugurated thereby.139  The professional lives, social status, and
material conditions of those working in institutions established in connec-
tion with the Nam Theun 2 project have also been reshaped through that
association.140
Practices surrounding the Nam Theun 2 project (though not directly
proceeding from it) may also evidence what Peck refers to as “place-specific
assaults on institutional and spatial strongholds of . . . social collectivism”
of a kind that Friedman would have championed.141  For example, the Lao
Women’s Union (LWU)— a key site of Lao political organizing since 1955,
enshrined in the Lao Constitution as one of the nation’s main “social orga-
nizations”— appears to be in the process of being succeeded by national
gender “machinery,” namely, the National Commission for the Advance-
ment of Women in Lao PDR, created in 2002, under the rubric of gender-
mainstreaming, which is a policy approach advanced by the United
Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM).142  One manifestation
of the LWU’s transitioning, or a process conducive to it, may have been
LWU members’ “[t]raining and capacity building . . . in consultation tech-
niques and participation as members of PCPD [Public Consultation, Par-
ticipation, and Disclosure] Teams” for the Nam Theun 2 project.143
In its very stylization, and its far-reaching character, this synthetic
jurisdiction evoked Friedman’s aspiration for the creation of self-sus-
taining “institutional arrangements” that might “provide a stable . . . frame-
work for a free economy”: a market economy, that is, in Friedman’s
parlance.144  While the Nam Theun 2 project by no means installed a sys-
tem of competitive capitalism in Lao PDR, it did generate new sites of polit-
ical and economic authority— the NTPC in particular— as actual or
prospective competitors to the Lao State, and it nested these authorities
and the Lao Government in an elaborate network of rules.  As such, these
arrangements gave effect to Friedman’s aim of having law maintain a “dis-
persal of power” and minimize “irresponsible government tinkering” by
giving preference to “rules instead of authorities.”145  The Concession
Agreement and related arrangements have encouraged relocated villagers
139. Financing, supra note 45; Economic Consulting Associates, supra note 137, at 25.
140. Sarinda Singh, Developing Bureaucracies for Environmental Governance: State
Authority and World Bank Conditionality in Laos, 44 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 322, 325– 26,
337– 38 (2014) (discussing how the education, training, work experience, salaries, and
working conditions of officials employed by the Watershed Management and Protection
Authority established and funded in connection with the Nam Theun 2 project com-
pared to those of their “district compatriots”).
141. PECK, supra note 3, at 26. Friedman’s societal ontology did not entertain the
prospect of collective organizations; it was limited to the individual, the family, the
household, and the enterprise. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 12– 14.
142. LAO CONST. of 2003, art. 7; Damdouane Khouangvichit, Socio-Economic Trans-
formation and Gender Relations in Lao PDR 53-59 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Umea˚ University), available at http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:3188
27/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
143. NAM THEUN II POWER COMPANY, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, vol. 1, ch. 4, at 7
(2005), available at http://www.namtheun2.com/documents/project-documents.html.
144. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 38– 39.
145. Id. at 39, 51.
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to look to NTPC rather than the State to address their social needs and
pursue economic opportunities (especially in light of the Concession
Agreement’s requirement that NTPC give some preference to Lao citizens
in employing project personnel).146  Collectively, the people of Laos have
also been directed by the Nam Theun 2 project to envisage their economic
future through the lens of a productive alliance with Thai energy consum-
ers, imagining themselves co-positioned with Thai consumers in a legally
mediated trade relationship premised on looking through rather than to the
Lao State.
If, however, Nam Theun 2 was to usher in economic conditions of
Milton Friedman’s imagining, it has manifestly failed.  Villagers in the pro-
ject’s vicinity do seem to have become increasingly enmeshed in debt rela-
tions, through the micro-credit operations of the Village Credit and Savings
Fund established in connection with the project.147  Nonetheless, the
capacity of villagers to engage in the sort of “entrepreneur[ship] of [the]
[ ]self” that Friedman envisaged individuals pursuing is limited by their
ongoing difficulty meeting subsistence needs.148  Degrees, qualities, and
directions of villagers’ aspiration may vary, even in the case of a single
individual.149  Nonetheless, as Rigg has argued, the people of the Nakai
Plateau on which the Nam Theun 2 project is located seem caught in a
“resource squeeze” arising from the combination of “a wealth-creating pro-
cess driven by the opening up of new market opportunities . . . and a pov-
erty-creating process driven by the erosion of traditional activities.”150  As
Rigg explains, “over-exploitation or under-production in one realm spills
into another.”151
As already noted, for Friedman, the ultimate safeguard of liberty is
abundance.152  There was little of this in evidence in the Nam Theun 2
project resettlement village that we visited, where the marketplace built for
local trade of produce stood unused.  An AUSAID-commissioned review of
the project confirmed what several villagers told us: that poor quality soils
in resettlement areas have meant that the agricultural activities that villag-
ers were encouraged to take up do not meet their subsistence needs, while
competition for river fish has intensified.153  In May 2014, the Panel of
146. Summary of the Concession Agreement, supra note 129, at 4.
147. DAVID MCDOWELL, ET AL., TWENTY SECOND REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PANEL OF EXPERTS 30 (2014), available at http://
www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/EAP/lao-pdr/1405_LA%20
NT2_POE%20Report%20%2322%20and%20LOM.pdf [hereinafter POE REPORT NO.
22].
148. FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 226.
149. Holly High, The Implications of Aspirations, 40 CRITICAL ASIAN STUD. 531, 531,
533 (2008) (arguing that those in resettlement villages in Laos employ “an experimental
and aspiration-oriented mode of engaging with the project” that prompted their resettle-
ment “and, through it, the state”).
150. J.D. Rigg, Forests, Marketization, Livelihoods and the Poor in the Lao PDR, 17 LAND
DEGRADATION & DEV. 123, 131 (2006).
151. Id. at 127.
152. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 14– 15.
153. BALL, supra note 69, at iv.
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Experts reporting to the Lao government on social and environmental
impacts of the project reiterated that there were “important problems” with
all of the “five pillars” of sustainable livelihood envisaged in project
planning.154
There also seems to have been relatively little evidence of the economic
power gained by the Nam Theun 2 project company NTPC, its investors,
partners, and advisors “offset[ting]” pre-existing concentrations of political
power, as Friedman envisaged.155  Friedman acknowledged that relations
between economic and political freedom are complex and not unilateral,
but he still maintained that a neoliberal version of competitive capitalism
leads to less inequality and greater political freedom than alternative sys-
tems of organization.156  Laos can hardly be described as the terrain of
competitive capitalism.  Nevertheless, as noted above, the NTPC has
offered some competition to the state in its provision of social services to
Lao villagers and information to the Lao public.  Yet any expectation, pur-
suant to Friedman’s teachings, that this competitor’s rise might have less-
ened material inequality or boosted political freedom has not been borne
out so far.  Despite impressive GDP growth, Laos’s Gini coefficient is rising
at one of the highest rates in Asia.157  Villagers near the project are now
well versed in answering surveys and engaging in rituals of consultation,
but many remain fearful and reluctant to speak out, either against the pro-
ject company or the Lao Government.158  With regard to political freedom
beyond the project’s immediate setting, one might turn to any one of the
(much criticized) indices that seek to quantify states’ relative performance
in this regard.159  In 2005, Laos was ranked 155th among the 167 coun-
tries listed in the Press Freedom Index published by the French-based
organization Reporters Without Borders.  By 2014, it had dropped to 171st
place among 180 nation states so indexed.160  Likewise, Laos was 77th
among 159 nation states surveyed in Transparency International’s Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index in 2005.  By 2013, it was ranked 140th among 175
nation states so listed.161
154. POE REPORT NO. 22, supra note 147, at 10.
155. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 39.
156. Id. at 10, 169– 170.
157. Juzhong Zhuang et al., Rising Inequality in Asia and Policy Implications 7 (Charles
H. Dyson School of Applied Econ. & Mgmt, Cornell U., Working Paper No. 2014-14,
2014), available at http://dyson.cornell.edu/research/researchpdf/wp/2014/Cornell-
Dyson-wp1414.pdf; Rigg, supra note 150, at 126 (“Perhaps the most significant theme to
be highlighted in socio-economic studies carried out in Laos since the mid-1990s has
been the recognition that . . . economic growth ha[s] been accompanied by a worrying
increase in inequality”).
158. Shalmali Guttal & Bruce Shoemaker, Manipulating Consent: The World Bank and
Public Consultation in the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project, 10 WATERSHED 18, 21, 24
(2004).
159. See generally Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights
and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83 (2011).
160. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2014 (2014), availa-
ble at http://rsf.org/index2014/data/index2014_en.pdf.
161. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2013 (2013), avail-
able at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.
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Consistent with Friedman’s view that the introduction of market-pro-
moting policy settings around non-governmental actors could generate an
“interwoven network of free institutions” over the long-term, it was a pre-
vailing expectation of the Nam Theun 2 project that it would serve as a
“standard setter” for future political and economic development in Lao
PDR.162  The Decision Framework for Processing the Proposed NT2 Pro-
ject, published by the World Bank in 2002, asserted that “it is critical to the
success of the project that sustained progress on reforms be maintained
over the long-run.”163  Contrary to these expectations, the Xayaburi pro-
ject’s development has been premised on a conscious dispensation with the
reformist template of Nam Theun 2 among Lao decision-makers, as high-
lighted above.  Meanwhile, EGAT’s cross-border trade with Laos notwith-
standing, the EGAT monopoly on Thai electricity markets that has long
stuck in the craw of neoliberal commentators remains as intractable as
ever.  One Thai commercial banker with whom we spoke expressed the
sort of deference with which the Lao Government today seems to be met in
the financial markets, now that it is flush with the financial success of Nam
Theun 2 and associated access to new sources of capital: “[I]n Laos . . . the
one that we have to listen to is the Lao Government.  It’s the Lao Govern-
ment, it’s not anyone else.”164  Far from “offsetting” the “coercive power of
the state,” as Friedman envisaged, the neoliberal experiment of Nam
Theun 2 seems to have augmented it, all while keeping alive the sense that
Laos is somehow en route to profound and ultimately emancipatory
change.165
These experiences in Laos do not refute Friedman’s thesis about the
relationship between political and economic freedom.  One would need a
larger canvas in order to do that.  In any event, one might query whether
Friedman’s theoretical model is of a sort that could ever really be proven
true or not, all the more so when assessed against “evidence” gathered
decades after Friedman was writing.166  Rather, these observations explain
162. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 202; Rob Laking, The Nam Theun 2
Hydro Project; A Better Kind of Dam? 3, 15 (Paper for the Ann. Conf. of the Aotearoa
N.Z. Int’l Dev. Stud. Network) (2008).
163. WORLD BANK, DECISION FRAMEWORK FOR PROCESSING THE PROPOSED NT2 PROJECT 4
(2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/
NT2_Decision_Framework.pdf.
164. Interview with Thai Bank Executive (Nov. 26, 2012) (on file with author).
165. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 202.
166. FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 9, 14. Arguing that the assess-
ment of economic theories or hypotheses by whether their assumptions are shown to be
empirically accurate is fundamentally mistaken, Friedman wrote: “Factual evidence can
never ‘prove’ a hypothesis; it can only fail to disprove it”; “Truly important and signifi-
cant hypotheses will be found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descrip-
tions of reality . . . A hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’ much by little . . . if it
abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed cir-
cumstances . . . and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be impor-
tant, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions.” For
discussion of this essay’s reception, criticism, and influence, see Thomas Mayer, Fried-
man’s Methodology of Positive Economics: A Soft Reading, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 213, 217
(1993).
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how the Nam Theun 2 project might be understood as a failure in
neoliberal terms, for purposes of its “failing forward” into Xayaburi.
If it marks the failure of the reformist aspirations with which the Nam
Theun 2 project was embedded, the Xayaburi project still expresses the
“rolling dynamic of experimentation” by which neoliberal restructuring
has been characterized— a dynamic “in many ways sustained by repeated
regulatory failure.”167  Xayaburi continues to instantiate Friedman’s con-
viction that promoting free trade internationally represents the best availa-
ble route to “an enormous accession of political and economic power” for
all participating, premised on their realization of “reciprocal benefits.”168
Xayaburi has also maintained at least some of the “ ‘market conforming’
regulatory incursions” identified with Nam Theun 2, as noted above.  It
certainly continues Laos’s enthusiastic “embrace of public-private partner-
ship,” a characteristic regulatory incursion of neoliberalism.169  Xayaburi
may, accordingly, be viewed as a less engineered version of neoliberal
experimentation, but a version of neoliberal experimentation nonetheless.
In terms of trying to understand how and why the forward momen-
tum of neoliberal experimentation was maintained in Laos, failure notwith-
standing, there are likely to have been many factors in play.  It may be that
the attractive investment returns gleaned from the Nam Theun 2 project in
large part explains this propulsion.170  It could be that the positive brand
value that has accumulated around the Nam Theun 2 project— in light of
both its timely construction and its financial complexity— has been a factor
favoring its replication (or rather, its remaking) in Xayaburi.171  The claim
of this Article is, nevertheless, that neoliberalism’s ambivalent modeling of
law, apparent in Friedman’s text— as a force both for maintaining state
authority and generating pathways for detouring around it— might have
helped, in part, to create conditions for that forward failure.  It is to the
neoliberal framing of law as a model to which we will now turn.
IV. Modular Law and Its Resilience
In Xayaburi, as noted above, the elaborate contractual architecture of
dialogue, audit, and monitoring put in place around Nam Theun 2 has
been almost entirely stripped away.  Even so, the sense that legally super-
167. Jamie Peck et al., Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents, 41 ANTIPODE 94, 106
(2010).
168. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 73.
169. PECK, supra note 3, at 23.
170. Merme et al., supra note 45, at 24, 26– 27 (citing a figure of 38% return on equity
for the Lao Government over the Concession Agreement term and sector-wide returns of
15% to 20% for shareholders generally).
171. Id. at 26 (“The financial complexity itself has become a marketing tool . . . in the
case of NT2, the creation and management of its financial scheme provides a reputation
that is mobilized in acquiring new projects. While the [World Bank] strongly promotes
the success of the financial construction of NT2 . . . its financial participants actively
promote their success in being able to deal with extensive, multifaceted and risky invest-
ments, involving a great number of actors, and their ability in defining guidelines for
complex large infrastructural projects”).
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vised development and legally mandated access to information— more or
less along the lines of the Nam Theun 2 project— might yet deliver more to
the Lao people has proven remarkably resilient in the context of hydro-
power development, unfulfilled promises notwithstanding.  Outside of
Laos, in Thailand especially, an array of organizations continues to clamor
for information and to contest decision-making surrounding both Nam
Theun 2 and Xayaburi in every available legal forum, as if, through sheer
intensity of parallel activity and commentary, to uncork in Laos that ever-
flowing wellspring of Friedman’s account: “free discussion and voluntary
cooperation.”172  Within Laos, too, Holly High has remarked upon “the
apparent ‘success’” that state-sponsored discourses of modernity, includ-
ing their legal dimensions, have had in “capturing the modernist yearnings
of poor people”:
Far from resisting the notion that resettlement may lead to improved and
desirable lives, poor people have embraced this narrative. What they rejected
and resisted was the state’s failure to actually deliver on this promise, or
make the narrative a reality. Thus, discourses of modernity break free from
the control of any one source (state or society) and are appropriated, inter-
preted, and misinterpreted in ways that can only partly be understood in
terms of domination and resistance.173
An understanding of neoliberal legality (or legally engineered, trade-
promoting development) as a reliable route to enhanced economic and
political power and wellbeing, more or less faithful to Friedman’s vision,
has thus emerged from this two-part sequence of projects remarkably
unscathed.  Any failure on the part of the Nam Theun 2 project to live up to
expectations seems to have been understood in terms of contingent and
contextual factors— above all, non-market factors— rather than as a basis for
questioning the premises upon which the project was structured.  Shannon
Lawrence’s sense of how one should understand and address the disap-
pointments of the Nam Theun 2 project is representative in this regard, in
its focus on factors outside the project’s economic structure and outside
project-specific legal and policy infrastructure:
In a country with a one-party authoritarian government, no independent
judiciary or independent civil society organizations, no free press, and a
ranking as one of the world’s 25 most corrupt countries by Transparency
International . . . dams have left a legacy of broken promises and uncompen-
sated losses.174
172. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 22. See generally Int’l Rivers, Xayaburi
Dam: Timeline of Events (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/
files/attached-files/xayaburi_dam_timeline_of_events_feb._2013_0.pdf; Bank Track,
Dodgy Deal: Xayaburi Dam, Laos  4– 7 (June 25, 2014), available at http://
www.banktrack.org/manage/ajax/ems_dodgydeals/createPDF/xayaburi_dam; Press
Release, Earth Rights Int’l, Austrian Firm Violates Ethics Guidelines in Destructive
Mekong Dam Project, Reported to Home Government (Apr. 9, 2014) available at http://
www.earthrights.org/media/austrian-firm-violates-ethics-guidelines-destructive-mekong-
dam-project-reported-home.
173. High, supra note 149, at 549.
174. Lawrence, supra note 54, at 82.
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As failure gets deflected towards considerations of context, culture,
and local legal and political institutions, these afford justification for
“doubling down” on neoliberal commitments and templates, rather than
inspiring innovation beyond or against them.175  Central to this capacity
for market-promoting development templates to survive their failures
(indeed thrive upon them) is their modularity.  Neoliberal policy thinking
has tended to trade in standardized designs, made up of discrete, separable,
scalable, and transferable elements.  This has been crucial to its global
success.
Law, in this tradition, is likewise the subject of modular configura-
tions, according to a seemingly incommensurable set of briefs that it is
called upon to carry— precisely the impossible mix of mandates that
Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom offers up for law.176  Neoliberal
law must be utterly “impersonal,” uniform and reliable in its operations, it
must be transformative of every aspect of life, yet it must also be purport-
edly minimal in scope and ambition, never straying beyond a limited list of
functions.177  Law must correct for a wide range of “neighborhood effects”
(or externalities), but must not encourage “governmental intervention” to
do so.178  It must preserve at all costs the integrity of economic arrange-
ments voluntarily concluded, however inscrutable or adverse to the pub-
lic.179  Almost everything beyond this that might be considered harmful,
unjust, or problematic is to be left to the workings of “taste,” choice, per-
suasion, patronage, and the seemingly infinite abundance of options that
economic life can deliver, so long as people maintain “belief in freedom
itself.”180  If power concentrates, in state hands or others, then this is, in
Friedman’s words, a “danger we cannot avoid,” but it is always a lesser
danger than failure to stay that course signposted as a route towards com-
petitive capitalism.181
So disarticulated, law becomes modular and thereby, to some degree,
insulated from question.  All the claims made of and for law in Capitalism
and Freedom— regarding impersonal reliability, non-intrusive protectiveness
and the like— are invested with the tenor of a hypothesis.  They amount to a
model, a “game” with rules, not an emergent or extant reality.182 As Fried-
man wrote of the “theory” that the “science” of economics aims to develop:
Such a theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two elements. In part,
it is a ‘language’ designed to promote ‘systematic and organized methods of
reasoning.’ In part, it is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to
abstract essential features of complex reality.183
175. I take the use of the phrase “doubling down” in this context from remarks by
Thomas Biebricher, in discussion at the Politics of Legality Workshop, supra note 2.
176. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13.
177. Id. at 15, 21, 34– 35, 119.
178. Id. at 30– 32.
179. Id. at 14.
180. Id. at 15– 21, 111.
181. Id. at 202.
182. Id. at 15, 25.
183. FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 7.
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Cast as both “language” and “hypothesis,” the characterization of law
in Capitalism and Freedom is not expected to correspond directly to “real
world” experience.184  Accordingly, where legal reforms reflective of a
Friedman-esque policy agenda do not deliver materially upon one or other
of the promises that they carry— for example, promises of a reduction in
“governmental intervention” or spontaneous improvement in economic
freedom— this need not cast the agenda itself into question.  On the con-
trary, observations along these lines are just as likely to fuel further
neoliberal experimentation.  “The necessity of relying on uncontrolled
experience rather than on controlled experiment makes it difficult to pro-
duce dramatic and clear-cut evidence to justify the acceptance of [the] ten-
tative hypotheses [of neoliberal theory],” Friedman remarked, and the very
same factors seemingly make it difficult to dispense with neoliberal hypoth-
eses as well.185  “Observed facts are necessarily finite in number; possible
hypotheses, infinite,” Friedman continued.  “If there is one hypothesis that
is consistent with the available evidence, there are always an infinite num-
ber that are,” Friedman wrote, such that “[t]he choice among alternative
hypotheses equally consistent with the available evidence must to some
extent be arbitrary.”186
Friedman’s tales of law and life are, he cautions, arbitrarily chosen,
“tentatively accepted generalizations,” and it is their very tentativeness that
ensures the durability of their acceptance.187  Compounding this is a sense
that innovation beyond or against these generalizations is, in Friedman’s
description, not something for which a community can organize.  Rather, it
must await the advent of inspiration approaching the divine:
The construction of [new] hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, intui-
tion, invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar mate-
rial. The process must be discussed in psychological, not logical, categories;
studied in autobiographies and biographies, not treatises on scientific
method; and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or
theorem.188
Even so, law does not wholly escape blame in relation to neoliberal-
ism’s setbacks, as the quote from Shannon Lawrence cited above made
clear.  The modular understanding of law set out in Capitalism and Free-
dom is not one designed for the avant-garde.  Rather, models of law in
Friedman’s telling always trail economic models or “hypotheses”; it is in
the latter’s service that the former are devised.  This pairing, too, is vital to
neoliberalism’s capacity for forward failure.
As between the “tentatively accepted generalizations” of economics
and those of law in Friedman’s writing, it seems relatively rare for a truth-
184. Id. at 30– 32.
185. Id. at 40.
186. Id. at 9.
187. Id. at 39. I discuss the durability of models in other legal and financial settings,
and their in-built tolerance for failure in Fleur Johns, Financing as Governance, 31
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 391, 402– 406 (2011).
188. FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 43.
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claim or a justice-claim (that is, a plea for the model itself to be more realis-
tic or more just) to be leveled at an economic model.189  Certainly, Fried-
man counsels comparison of “the actual with the actual” when evaluating
the relative effects of “the market” and “governmental intervention.”190  Yet
this comparison is one that he feels able to dispose of quite summarily in
the market’s favor:
If a balance be struck, there can be little doubt that the record is dismal.  The
greater part of the new ventures undertaken by the government in the past
few decades have failed to achieve their objectives . . . . Governmental mea-
sures have hampered not helped . . . development.191
In contrast, Friedman cannot or will not declare any particular
“actual” instance of competitive capitalism a failure for two reasons: first,
because Friedman simply does not seem to see (or at least, does not present
to his readers) evidence of failure on the part of market-conforming
endeavor; and second, because any such failure is made, in his account, to
attach to the actual as compared to the ideal.  Any “actual operation of the
market” will, Friedman emphasizes, inevitably fall short of its “ideal opera-
tion.”192  To criticize the ideal for the failings of the actual as against the
ideal would be to misconstrue the character of an “ideal type,” Friedman
admonishes.193  Yet the ideal type of “governmental intervention” is not so
redeemed in his work; rather, it is made to stand and fail by its supposedly
“dismal” record in the realm of the actual.
However modular may be its rendering, neoliberal legality does not
seem as well disposed as neoliberal economic models to deflect truth-
claims and justice-claims, in part because neoliberal legality is far more
likely to face such claims than a neoliberal economic model.  A neoliberal
legal model tends to “take the fall,” idiomatically speaking, for unrealized
promises that might otherwise be traced to its economic counterpart: the
ideal type of a free market economy.  When Shannon Lawrence lamented
the Nam Theun 2 project’s “legacy of broken promises and uncompensated
losses” in the quote above, it was to law— and to the recurrent themes of
contemporary law and development work, the need for reform and training
of the judiciary, the imperative of addressing corruption and the like— that
she turned for explanation, blame-laying, and a sense of what remains to
be done better.  Similarly, it was on non-market, Lao-specific, and mainly
legal conditions on which Nathanial Matthews focused in a 2012 article
decrying the “water grabbing” occurring in the Mekong River Basin,
namely: “[t]he government of Lao[s’s] . . . lack of capacity to regulate devel-
opment, the existence of corruption and a closed state that controls [Inter-
national NGOs] and forbids grassroots civil society.”194  Accordingly, it is
189. On the market’s resistance to considerations of justice in the work of Hayek, see
Cohen, supra note 61, at 385– 86.
190. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 197.
191. Id. at 199– 200.
192. Id. at 197.
193. FRIEDMAN, POSITIVE ECONOMICS, supra note 4, at 34.
194. Matthews, supra note 100, at 406.
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the social and legal reform agenda most closely associated with these defi-
ciencies that gets shed in the transition from Nam Theun 2 to Xayaburi,
not the overarching neoliberal economic model, deployed and redeployed
seemingly without much question among proponents.
Both the modularity of neoliberal accounts of law, and those accounts’
protective shepherding of a certain model of a free market economy, under-
pin the capacity of neoliberal policy programs to combine with a remarka-
ble range of institutions and agendas.  They underpin, too, the propensity
for that combination to occur in a way that ensures that any “failure” of
those programs will be localized and attributed to context: to non-market,
social, and legal conditions especially.  Friedman’s account of law— and
the wide-ranging legal and social reform program that followed from that
account in the case of Nam Theun 2— is at once so short-form and so ambi-
tious that is seems designed for failure and consequent abjuration.  Recall
that program’s scope in Nam Theun 2: it extended from water conservation
to family planning.195  The program of economic transformation with
which these reforms were bound up seems relatively modest by compari-
son: competition and consumption are more or less all that was said to be
required, plus reform aimed consistently at their promotion.
Neoliberalism’s polycephalous yet short-form account of law aids, in
particular, neoliberalism’s splicing with one party state power.  In this
regard, the work of law is functional but also faith-making.  Perhaps the
most that law does, in the interest of sustaining a neoliberal reform agenda
in one party states, is to keep alive the appetite for choice-borne, informa-
tion-fueled freedom that is at once a source of that state’s prospective legiti-
macy and a potential harbinger of its demise.  Law-borne faith in the power
and freedom of the act of informed choice is the crucible in which the
sense of neoliberalism having so far failed and the sense of it maintaining
unassailable forward momentum are alloyed.  This is again why the social
and legal reform agenda associated with Nam Theun 2 bore the brunt of
that project’s failures: because it was those aspects of the reformist pro-
gram that traded most explicitly and promiscuously in the language of
faith, aspiration, capacity, and promise.  It was not the Nam Theun 2 pro-
ject itself so much as its social and legal mitigants— the related resettlement
program, for instance, and associated public and private sector initiatives—
that enlivened futurist hope in the Lao community at large.196  When aspi-
rations so elicited were not realized, laws and institutions concerned
seemed at fault, or indeed people themselves were made to seem wanting,
rather than the economic architecture the project was to entrench.  By
engaging directly, albeit in abbreviation, in terms of what could and should
be, explicitly legal or social dimensions of the neoliberal model for develop-
ment helped to both sustain that model and shield it from critical inquiry
in the transition from Nam Theun 2 to Xayaburi in Laos.
195. Goldman, supra note 59, at 506.
196. High, supra note 149, at 531.
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Conclusion
Could it be mere coincidence that Milton Friedman carved out “mag-
nificent dams spanning great rivers” from the derision that he otherwise
afforded government reform projects at the end of Capitalism and Free-
dom?197  Perhaps, in some magical and improbable leap of the imagination
through time and space, Friedman was evoking the Mekong and the strong-
arm states that line its banks; the very states that would, decades later,
boldly carry forward versions of his vision of a state being transformed,
through patronage, aspiration, and trade, into an economy that it might
eventually be “appropriate to treat . . . as if it were competitive.”198
This Article has explored how it is that such a vision could have been
maintained in Laos, in the face of the apparent failure of its predictions and
promises to materialize.  In Lao hydropower development, as discussed, the
neoliberal hyperbole of the Nam Theun 2 project failed forward into the
relative obduracy of the Xayaburi project.  In so doing, parties and policy-
makers in each case mobilized a modular account of law, comprised at
once of measures designed to ensure the state’s rigorous stability and
mechanisms to enable the circumvention of state authority.  That hybrid
model of law has, in turn, become the target of criticism and reform effort
in relation to the projects’ perceived failings (in the case of Nam Theun 2
especially), allowing the economic model with which it was paired to
emerge relatively unscathed and readied for further renewal.
What, then, does this account of neoliberal legality’s durable modu-
larity imply for those who would continue to probe “the tension between
capitalist and democratic imperatives” in the Mekong River Basin and else-
where?199  Let me begin with what it does not support.  Recognition of the
power and resilience of a neoliberal juridical model does not suggest that
commentators and critics should aim to defuse or improve that model by
recourse to context, the “grassroots,” or any other mode of laying claim to
popular authenticity.  On the contrary, this Article has shown just how
easily criticism of this kind tends to run off the back of the neoliberal
development paradigm or, in the alternative, serves to justify its iterative
extension.
The foregoing account similarly does not support any conclusion that
models— of law, economics, or anything else— and the practice of thinking
with models are hard-wired with a particular politics.  To think with a
model is not necessarily neoliberal, any more than dispensing with a
model would be necessarily progressive or anti-neoliberal.  Moreover,
neoliberal thought frequently operates in relation to law in other modes:
through the intricacies of legal doctrine and judicial decision-making, for
instance.200
197. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM, supra note 13, at 199.
198. Id. at 120.
199. Singh Grewal & Purdy, supra note 1, at 22.
200. See generally James M. Cooper, Competing Legal Cultures and Legal Reform: The
Battle of Chile, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 501 (2007– 2008).
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A model may elicit “design thinking,” but the propagation of models
in neoliberal thought need not have been the outcome of such thinking.201
Compelling studies of neoliberal thought suggest that its influence may
instead be attributable to “a combination of dogmatism and adaptability,
strategic intent and opportunistic explanation, programmatic vision and
tactical smarts, principle and hypocrisy.”202  Certainly, this is the way that
Milton Friedman seems to have understood the makings of success as a
public intellectual, that is, as a matter of generating “the ideas that are
lying around” when a crisis occurs, or is perceived to have occurred, or
“develop[ing] alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and availa-
ble until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.”203
It may be as a tale of success through failure, more or less in these
terms, that the story of Nam Theun 2, Xayaburi, and the legal and policy
infrastructure surrounding each of these projects might resonate for those
who worry both about the extraordinary prevalence of neoliberal public
reason in law and development work today, and about some of its apparent
down sides.  The “inevitab[ility]” of approaching law reform in poor coun-
tries through a neoliberal prism is something that Friedman, his col-
leagues, students, and acolytes worked hard to bring about by forging
somewhat unlikely alliances across geographic borders, disciplines, and
institutions, and laboring to “keep [alternatives] alive,” especially in modu-
lar form.  Those critical of the Nam Theun 2 and Xayaburi development
models, or of other projects like them, might learn from the example of
Friedman, and others in the neoliberal “thought collective,” to develop
interventions which do not merely embellish those models, or aid their
forward failure, but rather pose alternatives to them.
Alternative models to those of neoliberal hydropower development dis-
cussed in this Article are still alive in the Mekong River Basin, as well as
among the many different types of market economies observable through-
out the world.204  For instance, pico-hydropower (comprised of hydro-elec-
tric turbines installed at the household or village level that generate up to 1
kW of electrical power, or up to 5 kW according to some definitions) is
well established across Laos.  Its prevalence maintains a “tension” within
Lao energy politics “between centralized production for export and domes-
tic off-grid rural electrification,” and among energy-generation practices
having vastly different degrees of adverse environmental and social
impact.205
201. See generally Rim Razzouk & Valerie Shute, What is Design Thinking and Why is it
Important?, 82 REV. EDUC. RES. 330 (2012).
202. PECK, supra note 3, at 4.
203. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM: FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY EDITION xiv
(2002) (1982).
204. On available room for choice among alternative market economies and within
any one such economy, see generally LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERIS-
TICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (David
Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013).
205. Mattijs Smits & Simon R. Bush, A Light Left in the Dark: The Practice and Politics
of Pico-Hydropower in the Lao PDR, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 116, 117 (2010); see also Jeffry
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The terrain of pico-hydropower— having so far operated with minimal
infrastructural, policy, or financial support from either public or private
sources— may be conceived of as a field of spontaneous market order or
“catallaxy.”206  Yet it could also be understood as a field in which various
coalitions of actors are organizing, or might yet organize, to help keep alive
alternative formulations of a market economy, or vocabularies of public
reason, to those championed by Friedman.207  Experiments and models
oriented around pico-hydropower and other sustainable energy-generation
practices might fail in any number of ways, but they might yet fail forward
in ways newly responsive to the abiding truth claims and justice claims that
neoliberal models of law so frequently seem unable or disinclined to
answer.
Susanto & Samuel Stamp, Local Installation Methods for Low Head Pico-Hydropower in the
Lao PDR, 44 RENEWABLE ENERGY 439, 439 (2012).
206. HAYEK, THE ROAD, supra note 22, at 14. This is indeed how the prevalence of
pico-hydropower is characterised in Smits & Bush, supra note 205, at 121– 2, 125– 6 and
Susanto & Stamp, supra note 205, at 439.
207. For an illustrative instance of regional actors generating alternative models and
assumptions to those on which Nam Theun 2 and Xayaburi rest, see generally
CHUENCHOM SANGARASRI GRAECEN & CHRIS GRAECEN, PROPOSED POWER DEVELOPMENT
PLAN (PDP) 2012: FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF
POWER SECTOR PLANNING (2012), available at http://www.palangthai.org/docs/PDP2012-
Eng.pdf. Far from rising resource values inevitably leading towards the emergence of
clear property rights and rules in accordance with standard neoliberal assumptions,
Daniel Fitzpatrick shows how a range of factors may make reversion to, or emergence of,
open or contested access regimes just as likely. See generally Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolu-
tion and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access,
115 YALE L.J. 996 (2006). An illustrative discussion of “shifting common-property
arrangements,” “local-level claims and incremental microprocesses of enclosure” in Laos
is provided by Nattaya Tubtim & Philip Hirsch, Common Property as Enclosure: A Case
Study of a Backswamp in Southern Laos, 18 SOC’Y & NATURAL RESOURCES: AN INT’L J. 41,
57– 58 (2004). The idea of contending or parallel registers of public reason, and their
amenability to comparative study, draws upon Sheila Jasanoff, Bhopal’s Trials of Knowl-
edge and Ignorance, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 679, 688– 692 (2008).
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